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Abstract
Consumer bankruptcy filing rates have soared during the past 25 years. From
225,000 filings in 1979, consumer bankruptcies topped 1.5 million during 2004.
This relentless upward trend is striking in light of the generally high prosper-
ity, low interest rates, and low unemployment during that period. This anomaly
of ever-upward bankruptcy filing rates during a period of economic prosperity
had spurred calls to reform the Bankruptcy Code to place new conditions on
bankruptcy relief. Although bankruptcy reform has drawn broad bipartisan sup-
port on Capitol Hill, these proposals have proven controversial within the academy.
Critics have argued that these reforms are unnecessary and punitive, and that pri-
vate market adjustments such as higher interest rates and more restrictive credit
rationing are suitable policy responses.
Scholars have previously identified two models of the consumer bankruptcy pro-
cess, the traditional “distress” model and the economic “incentives” model. Nei-
ther, however, can explain the observed bankruptcy filing patterns of recent decades.
This article offers a new model of consumer bankruptcy rooted in New Institu-
tional Economics that explains the rise in consumer bankruptcy filings as reflect-
ing changes in the institutions, incentives, and constraints surrounding the con-
sumer bankruptcy filing decision. It is argued that this new model of consumer
bankruptcy is both theoretically and empirically superior to the traditional model.
This article identifies three institutional factors that can explain the observed rise
in bankruptcy filings over the past several decades: (1) A change in the relative
economic costs and benefits associated with filing bankruptcy; (2) A change in
social norms regarding bankruptcy; and (3) Changes in the nature of consumer
credit, toward more national and impersonal forms of consumer credit. It is ar-
gued that all of these factors tend to increase the incentives for filing bankruptcy
or reduce the constraints imposed on filing bankruptcy. The result has been to
increase the equilibrium level of bankruptcy filings in America.
Finally, the article briefly discusses some policy implications of the model pre-
sented here, focusing most specifically on the proposals contained in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act that Congress is again considering, but also addressing more far-
reaching proposals, such efforts to reverse changes in social norms or proposals
to allow contracting-around the mandatory discharge provision of current law.
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ABSTRACT 
Consumer bankruptcy filing rates have soared during the past 25 years.  From 
225,000 filings in 1979, consumer bankruptcies topped 1.5 million during 2004.  This 
relentless upward trend is striking in light of the generally high prosperity, low interest 
rates, and low unemployment during that period.  This anomaly of ever-upward 
bankruptcy filing rates during a period of economic prosperity had spurred calls to reform 
the Bankruptcy Code to place new conditions on bankruptcy relief.  Although bankruptcy 
reform has drawn broad bipartisan support on Capitol Hill, these proposals have proven 
controversial within the academy.  Critics have argued that these reforms are unnecessary 
and punitive, and that private market adjustments such as higher interest rates and more 
restrictive credit rationing are suitable policy responses. 
Scholars have previously identified two models of the consumer bankruptcy 
process, the traditional “distress” model and the economic “incentives” model.  Neither, 
however, can explain the observed bankruptcy filing patterns of recent decades.  This 
article offers a new model of consumer bankruptcy rooted in New Institutional 
Economics that explains the rise in consumer bankruptcy filings as reflecting changes in 
the institutions, incentives, and constraints surrounding the consumer bankruptcy filing 
decision. It is argued that this new model of consumer bankruptcy that is both 
theoretically and empirically superior to the traditional model.  
This article identifies three institutional factors that can explain the observed rise 
in bankruptcy filings over the past several decades: (1) A change in the relative economic 
costs and benefits associated with filing bankruptcy; (2) A change in social norms 
regarding bankruptcy; and (3) Changes in the nature of consumer credit, toward more 
national and impersonal forms of consumer credit.  It is argued that all of these factors 
tend to increase the incentives for filing bankruptcy or reduce the constraints imposed on 
filing bankruptcy.  The result has been to increase the equilibrium level of bankruptcy 
filings in America. 
Finally, the article briefly discusses some policy implications of the model 
presented here, focusing most specifically on the proposals contained in the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act that Congress is again considering, but also addressing more far-reaching 
proposals, such efforts to reverse changes in social norms or proposals to allow 
contracting-around the mandatory discharge provision of current law. 
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Consumer bankruptcy filing rates have soared during the past 25 years.  From 
225,000 filings in 1979, consumer bankruptcies topped 1.5 million last year.  This 
relentless upward trend is especially striking given in light of generally high prosperity, 
low interest rates, and low unemployment during that period.  This anomaly of ever-
upward bankruptcy filing rates during a period of relative prosperity had spurred repeated 
calls over the past several years to reform the Bankruptcy Code to place new conditions 
on bankruptcy relief.  Although bankruptcy reform has drawn broad bipartisan support on 
Capitol Hill, these proposals have proven controversial within the academy and 
enactment of the legislation has proven elusive.  Critics have argued that these reforms 
are unnecessary and punitive in light of their understanding of the causes of the 
bankruptcy crisis. 
Critics of reform argue that consumer bankruptcy filings today are caused by the 
same basic forces that traditionally have caused bankruptcy filings—heavy household 
distress caused by overindebtedness, often combined with unexpected income or expense 
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shocks, such as unemployment, divorce, or health problems.  Although this “traditional 
model” of consumer bankruptcy explained the world tolerably well for several decades, it 
cannot explain the upward trend in bankruptcy filing rates over the past 25 years.1  
Individuals increasingly appear to be choosing to file bankruptcy as a response to 
financial distress, rather than reducing spending or tapping savings to avoid bankruptcy. 
Other scholars have advanced a second approach, an “economic incentives” 
model that the views the consumer bankruptcy filing decision as a direct and predictable 
response to the incentives provided by the bankruptcy law.  As will be seen, neither the 
traditional model nor the economic maximization model can explained the observed 
pattern of bankruptcy filings.  The observed rate is much higher than the traditional 
model would predict, and much lower than the economic maximization model predicts.  
Moreover, neither model can explain the dynamic upward trend in filing patterns over 
time. 
Critiquing the prevailing models is insufficient, however; it is essential to offer an 
alternative model that better explains the observed data.2  This article provides a new 
model of consumer bankruptcy that can explain the trends of the past twenty-five years 
more persuasively than the prevailing models.  The model offered here is anchored in the 
New Institutional Economics, associated with scholars such as Nobel Laureate Douglass 
North and Oliver Williamson.  The model offered here sees the rising consumer 
bankruptcy rate as reflecting an increasing tendency for individuals to choose bankruptcy 
as the response to financial problems.  In turn, the increased frequency of this choice 
                                                 
1 See Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, ___ NORTHWESTERN L. 
REV. ___ (Forthcoming 2005). 
2 As Kuhn observes, the test of a new theory is whether it explains the observed evidence better than the 
prevailing model or “paradigm.”  See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 77 (2d 
ed. 1970). 
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reflects changes in the institutions and incentives that have led Americans increasingly to 
choose bankruptcy in response to financial distress. 
This article identifies three institutional changes that have contributed to the 
increase in consumer bankruptcies over the past few decades.  First, there has been a 
change in the relative economic costs and benefits associated with filing bankruptcy.  The 
economic benefits of bankruptcy have increased because of the adoption of the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code.  At the same time, the costs associated with filing bankruptcy have 
fallen, such as reductions in the transaction and search costs associated with learning 
about and filing bankruptcy.  Second, there has been a change in social norms regarding 
bankruptcy, reducing the shame and stigma that traditionally constrained bankruptcy 
filings.3  Third, there has been a fundamental change in the nature of consumer credit in 
the economy, which has expanded the use of general unsecured consumer credit in the 
economy and reduced its use of traditional local and informal types of credit.  This 
evolution has increased the relative use of unsecured revolving consumer credit that is 
dischargeable in bankruptcy as well as eroding many of the informal constraints that 
restrained bankruptcy filings, such as trust, repeat-dealing, and the effects of reputation.  
Ironically, those who have argued that the expansion of credit card use has contributed to 
rising bankruptcy filings may be correct—but for the wrong reason.  Credit cards have 
not increased overall indebtedness and household financial distress, as is generally 
assumed, but consumers have simply substituted credit cards and other modern forms of 
unsecured credit for other types of credit, thereby leaving total consumer debt levels 
                                                 
3 I have elsewhere distinguished these terms: “Personal shame and social stigma go hand-in-hand.  Shame 
is the internal psychological compass that forces one to keep his word; stigma is the external, social 
constraint that reinforces this.” Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY L. REV. 177, 215 (1999). 
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largely unaffected.  By substituting more impersonal forms of credit for more localized 
retail and similar debt, however, this evolution has weakened the traditional extralegal 
checks on bankruptcy filings.  It is argued that this new model of consumer bankruptcy is 
both theoretically and empirically superior to the traditional model.  
The article then briefly discusses some policy implications of the model described 
here.4  First, the analysis presented here provides a conceptual justification for many of 
the key elements of the recent bankruptcy reform agenda, which are designed to modify 
the incentives and institutions surrounding consumer bankruptcy.  Just as the traditional 
model manifested itself in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the new model of consumer 
bankruptcy is consistent with much of the current bankruptcy reform agenda in recent 
years.5  In that sense, this article is the first to provide a comprehensive conceptual 
explanation for the bankruptcy reform movement.  Ironically, it appears that policy-
makers may have recognized what most bankruptcy scholars have not yet—that we live 
in a fundamentally new world of consumer bankruptcy. 
Finally, the model presented here raises new questions about the scope of the 
American fresh-start policy in American bankruptcy law.  In particular, by showing that 
the bankruptcy decision is to some extent under the control of the debtor, and that this 
choice is based on unobservable information such as personal commitment to repayment 
of financial obligations, the analysis presented here raises new questions about the 
mandatory fresh-start policy embedded in American consumer bankruptcy law. 
                                                 
4 These policy implications are discussed in greater detail in a subsequent article.  See Todd J. Zywicki, 
Bankruptcy Reform: An Economic Analysis (working paper). 
5  See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S.B. 256, introduced January 
30, 2005.  This bill is the fourth consecutive Congress in which comprehensive bankruptcy reform 
legislation has been introduced.   This bill is substantially similar in all relevant ways to earlier versions of 
the same legislation from earlier Congresses.  As a result, when this article refers to “bankruptcy reform 
legislation” it intends to reference the entire course of these bills, rather than specifically the most recent 
version. 
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I. New Institutional Economics and Consumer Bankruptcy 
Consumer bankruptcy filing rates are usually explained according to two different 
models.6  The first model, which I have labeled the “traditional model” (and which others 
have labeled the “distress” model), views consumer bankruptcies as arising from 
household financial distress.  Under this model, higher bankruptcy filings are predicted to 
be caused by higher levels of household financial distress.  The second model, variously 
called the “economic” maximization or “incentives” model, views consumer bankruptcy 
filings as a direct and predictable response to the economic incentives provided by the 
Bankruptcy Code.  As the Code increases the benefits of filing bankruptcy, it is predicted 
that more consumers will file bankruptcy.  Neither can explain the consumer bankruptcy 
filing patters of recent years. 
For most of the Twentieth Century, consumer bankruptcy filings followed a 
relatively predictable pattern, rising in times of economic recessions (peaking at the 
height of the Great Depression) but then falling to a low, steady-state rate after the 
economic crisis abated.  Beginning in the 1950s, however, consumer bankruptcy filings 
have started to trend gradually upward.  Beginning in the 1980s, bankruptcy filing rates 
rose more rapidly, and began to rise dramatically during the 1990s.  After a brief dip at 
the end of the 1990s, bankruptcies have surged upward in the new century, reaching 1.5 
million in 2004.  These trends are shown in Figure 1: 
                                                 
6 See Richard M. Hynes, Bankruptcy and State Collections: The Case of the Missing Garnishments 
(working paper).  Hynes refers to these as the “distress” and “incentives” model.  Others have characterized 
them as “sociological” and “economic” models.  See Michelle J. White, Economic Versus Sociological 
Approaches to Legal Research: The Case of Bankruptcy, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 685 (1991). 
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Figure 1: Bankruptcy Filings, 1945-2003
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Source: Bankruptcy Filings, Admin. Office of U.S. Courts; Number Households, U.S. Census Bureau 
This upward trend in filing rates has come during a period of unprecedented economic 
prosperity.  The experience of the 1990s is especially striking, in that bankruptcies surged 
in the face of low unemployment, low interest rates, and record-high wealth accumulation 
due to gains in the stock market and household real estate holdings. 
The evidence indicates that the rise in consumer bankruptcy filing rates is the 
result not of greater economic distress, as the traditional model would predict, but rather, 
from an increasing propensity of American households to file bankruptcy in response to 
economic problems.7  In the past, households that suffered an economic dislocation 
tended to respond by reducing spending, tapping savings, taking a second job, and 
eventually repaying their obligations.  Although many Americans today still respond to 
financial distress in the same way, an increasing number are filing bankruptcy and 
                                                 
7 See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1. 
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discharging their debts instead.  What is novel, are not the underlying problems, but 
rather, the increasing frequency of Americans choosing bankruptcy as a response to those 
underlying problems. 
The fundamental problem with the traditional model is that it conflates two 
conceptually distinct questions: first, how families get in to financial distress in the first 
place and second, how they come to choose to get out of financial distress.  Financial 
difficulty presents a menu of options in addition to bankruptcy, from increasing one’s 
income (such as by taking on a second job), decreasing one’s expenditures (such as by 
eating out less or vacationing less), or by liquidating assets and using the proceeds to pay 
debts (such as moving to a smaller house).   
On the other hand, adherents to the economic maximization model have found a 
substantial difference between the bankruptcy filing rates that would be predicted to 
result from simple consumer maximizing behavior and what is actually observed in 
practice.8  Estimates are as much as 15-33% of Americans would financially benefit from 
filing bankruptcy; in practice, however, only a small fraction actually do so.9  Moreover, 
it is argued that although the 1978 Code increased the incentives to file bankruptcy, it did 
not change the law so dramatically as to explain the subsequent jump in bankruptcy filing 
rates.  This gap suggests that there must be some sort of extralegal mediating institutions 
that are not captured in the neoclassical economic model.  Moreover, in order to explain 
how changes in these factors have driven changes in bankruptcy filing rates it is 
necessary for these factors to be dynamic, not static.  They must be capable of explaining 
                                                 
8 See Michelle J. White, Why Don’t More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 205 
(1998).  In addition, as Richard Hynes finds, there also appears to be substantial stability in non-bankruptcy 
debt collection rules that have traditionally been thought to lead to bankruptcy, such as garnishment.  See 
Hynes, Missing Garnishments, supra note 6. 
9 See discussion infra at note 20 and accompanying text. 
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change over time.  Given the absence of any significant amendments to the Bankruptcy 
Code during the past 20 years, it is difficult to see how the economic incentives model, 
standing alone, can explain a 500% increase in bankruptcy filings during that period.  
This suggests that there must be some sort of mediating institutional influences that are 
not captured in the incentives-based economic model. 
Both the traditional and economic maximization models, therefore, suffer from a 
common limitation—the both fail to account for the complexity of the individual 
bankruptcy filing decision and the institutional framework that surrounds it.  
Understanding the bankruptcy filing decision requires an examination of the consumer 
bankruptcy institutions that provide the incentives and constraints on filing bankruptcy, 
not the factors that cause the underlying financial distress.10   
In the New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework, institutions serve two 
functions: they provide incentives and they provide a transactional framework.11  First, 
institutions provide incentives by channeling individual behavior in particular directions.  
For instance, criminal law is an institution that provides incentives to acquire property by 
consensual exchange rather than by theft, channeling behavior toward wealth-creation 
and peaceful exchange of property.  Second, institutions provide a transactional 
framework, such as rules of property and contract that instruct people on how to 
coordinate their affairs so as to accomplish their plans.  Contract law, for instance, 
instructs people on how to enter into enforceable exchanges of entitlements; property law 
                                                 
10 Douglass North has defined an “institution” as: “[T]he humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (e.g. rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints 
(e.g. norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes-of-conduct), and their enforcement 
characteristics. Together, they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies.”  See 
Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AMER. ECON. REV. 359, 360 (1994). 
11 See DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 27 
(1990). 
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instructs people on how to protect their property from the claims of others.  Institutions 
can be formal or informal.  Criminal law is an institution, but so is morality and social 
norms, which also constrain antisocial behavior.  Contract law is an institution, but so is 
the development of a reputation or trademark that also encourages the performance of 
promises even where contract enforcement is lacking.12  Thus, institutions provide 
incentives, but they need not be consciously designed for that purpose, nor are they 
necessarily under conscious design and control. 
This article discusses the institutional changes that have increased the propensity 
of Americans to file bankruptcy in recent years.  Three general factors appear to have 
driven the increase in bankruptcy filing rates in recent years: (1) Changes in the relative 
economic costs and benefits of filing bankruptcy; (2) A change in the social norms 
regarding bankruptcy; and (3) Changes in the nature of consumer credit that have led to 
an increased willingness of borrowers at the margin to discharge their obligations in 
bankruptcy.  Each factor tends to push in the direction of increasing filings.  This article 
also review the available empirical evidence, which tends to support the model advanced 
here.13  It is hoped that by identifying the relevant factors that may be help to explain the 
bankruptcy boom this will help to elicit better empirical testing in the future. 
 
II. Changes in the Relative Benefits and Costs of Filing Bankruptcy 
                                                 
12 See Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual 
Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981). 
13 Most prevision empirical study has been grounded in the traditional model of bankruptcy, and thus does 
not focus on the factors identified here.  Professor Robert Chapman has observed that statistical analysis of 
bankruptcy, as with all science, is heavily dependent on externally chosen assumptions about conceptual 
categories and causal relationships.  See Robert B. Chapman, Missing Persons: Social Science and 
Accounting for Race, Gender, Class, and Marriage in Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 347, 397-98 (2002).  
Chapman notes that statistics, “Both depend on and create a view of the world.”  Id. at 397. 
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The first factor that has contributed to increasing consumer bankruptcies is a 
change in the relative benefits and costs associated with filing bankruptcy.  In the past 
twenty-five years, there simultaneously have been increases in the economic benefits and 
reductions in the economic costs of filing bankruptcy.14  These changes in the relative 
costs and benefits associated with declaring bankruptcy create incentives at the margin to 
file bankruptcy that are reflected in the increasing bankruptcy filing rates of recent 
decades. 
A. The Economic Benefits of Filing Bankruptcy Have Risen 
1. The 1978 Code Increased the Economic Benefits of Filing Bankruptcy 
It is generally accepted that the economic benefits to an individual from filing 
bankruptcy increased with the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code; the primary 
points of disagreement has been the extent to which consumers have responded to these 
changed incentives from an economically rational perspective and whether this change 
has been good or bad overall from a normative perspective.15  Although the evidence of 
                                                 
14 One could also consider reduced stigma as a reduction in the social “cost” of filing bankruptcy.  See 
Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1063 (1974); see also Note, A Reformed 
Economic Model of Consumer Bankruptcy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1338, 1347 (1996).  For purposes of 
exposition, in this Part of the article I have focused on more tangible and direct economic costs and 
discuss the effects of reduced social stigma separately, although those factors could be classified as a 
relevant “cost” of bankruptcy if one were so inclined to treat it that way. 
15 Professor William Whitford has observed “it is hard to believe that the enactment of the Code has not 
had any effect on bankruptcy filing rates.”  William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: 
Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 
AM. BANKR. L. J. 397, 399 n.11 (1994).  He adds, “It is indisputable that consumers can often achieve 
better economic results through bankruptcy today than they would have been able to achieve if the law 
had not been changed.  To assume that this change has had no effect on decisions to file, one would have 
to make monumental changes in the usual assumptions about the responsiveness of humans to financial 
incentives in commercial matters.”  Id.  Summaries of some of the major pro-debtor changes ushered in by 
the 1978 Code can be found in Ian Domowitz and Robert L. Sartain, Incentives and Bankruptcy Chapter 
Choice: Evidence form the Reform Act of 1978, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 467 (1999); Charles Jordan Tabb, 
The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 34-37 (1995); 
Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 275, 275-97 
(1980).  In congressional testimony, the American Bankruptcy Institute acknowledged that the 1978 Code 
“made bankruptcy a much more debtor-friendly law.”  See Personal Bankruptcy Consumer Credit Crises: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th 
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an increased filing effect is somewhat mixed, most scholars conclude that the enactment 
of the Code did have some effect of increasing bankruptcy filings at the margin, although 
the changes from previous law were not large enough to account for all of the subsequent 
rise in filings.16 
As originally enacted, the 1978 Bankruptcy Code placed few restrictions on a 
debtor’s ability to file bankruptcy, regardless of the debtor’s need for bankruptcy relief or 
ability to repay her debts.  The motivation of the drafters of the 1978 Code for doing this 
is somewhat unclear, but it seems that they believed that legal restraints on debtor 
opportunism were unnecessary and that social and economic constraints would be 
sufficient to prevent opportunistic use of the bankruptcy system by debtors.17  Whatever 
the rationale, the Legislative History to the 1978 Code states, “The section does not 
contemplate . . . that the ability of the debtor to repay his debts in whole or in part 
constitutes adequate cause for dismissal.”18  Nor is insolvency required before filing. 
Concerned by an immediate surge in bankruptcy filings following the enactment 
of the 1978 Code, in 1984 Congress amended the Code to place some modest limits on 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cong., 1st Sess. (April 11, 1997) (Statement of the American Bankruptcy Institute), available in 1997 WL 
176645 at 7. 
16 Most commentators have concluded that the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code has caused some 
increase in the bankruptcy filing rate.  See F.H. Buckley, The American Fresh Start, 4 S. CAL. 
INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 67, 76-77 (1995); Lawrence Shepard, Personal Failures and the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, 27 J. L. & ECON. 419 (1984); Richard L. Peterson and Kiyomi Aoki, Bankruptcy 
Filings Before and After Implementation of the Bankruptcy Reform Law, 36 J. ECON. & BUS. 95 (1995); 
William J. Boyes and Roger L. Faith, Some Effects of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 29 J. L. & 
ECON. 139; William T. Vukowich, Reforming the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Alternative 
Approach, 71 GEO. L.J. 1129 (1983).  Other studies failed to detect a significant increase in filing rates as 
a result of the 1978.  See Jagdeep S. Bhandari and Lawrence A. Weiss, The Increasing Bankruptcy Filing 
Rate: An Historical Analysis, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1993); Ian Domowitz and Thomas L. Eovaldi, The 
Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 on Consumer Bankruptcy, 36 J. L. & ECON. 803 (1993).  For 
a criticism of the statistical methods used in these latter two studies, see F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. 
Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 194 n.17. 
17 See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 131-160 
(2002), 
18 Legislative History to 11 U.S.C. §707(b).  For a discussion of the political developments that led to the 
emergence of §707(b), see SKEEL, supra note 17, at 196-97. 
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the ability of consumers who file bankruptcy opportunistically.  In particular, the 1984 
amendments added §707(b) to the Code, empowering bankruptcy judges to dismiss a 
debtor’s bankruptcy case if granting relief would amount to a “substantial abuse” of the 
bankruptcy system.  In practice, however, this power has been used only rarely, 
sporadically, and inconsistently to police debtor opportunism.19  Thus, §707(b) has done 
little in practice to reduce the economic benefits associated with filing bankruptcy, even 
for those with high repayment capacity.   
It has been estimated by one scholar that with a modest degree of pre-bankruptcy 
planning as much as one-third of American households could gain financially from filing 
bankruptcy and the financial benefit from filing is greatest for well-off debtors.20  
Calculation of the economic benefits from filing bankruptcy also partially explains 
debtors’ choices between Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.21  Overall, there appears to be 
substantial economic benefits from filing bankruptcy for many people. 
But bankruptcy does not merely give a debtor the opportunity to discharge 
financial obligations.  There are also intangible benefits associated with filing bankruptcy 
                                                 
19 Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3; Todd J. Zywicki, With Apologies to Screwtape: A Response to 
Professor Alexander, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 613 (2000).  Professor Jack Williams, for instance, has 
described §707(b) as a “dismal failure” in preventing abuse.  See Jack F. Williams, Distrust: The Rhetoric 
and Reality of Means-Testing, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 105 (1998).    See also Scott Fay, Erik Hurst, 
& Michelle White, The Household Bankruptcy Decision, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 706, 707 n.4 (2002) (noting 
that “later court decisions and lack of enforcement made [the substantial abuse provision] ineffective”); 
Wayne R. Wells, Janell M. Kurtz, and Robert J. Calhoun, The Implementation of Bankruptcy Code Section 
707(b): The Law and the Reality, 39 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 15 (1991); Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh 
Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case of Narrow Construction of the Consumer Credit Amendments, 
135 U. PA. L. REV. 59 (1986). 
20 See Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at Incentives Under U.S. Bankruptcy Laws and 
a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 685 (1998); White, supra note 8, at 214 (concluding that a 
minimum of 15% and as much as 23% of American population could financially benefit from filing 
bankruptcy); Fay, Hurst, & White, supra note 19, at 712 (finding 18% of households in study would 
benefit financially from filing bankruptcy). 
21 See Domowitz and Sartain, Incentives and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice, supra note 15, at 481-82.  For 
instance, states with higher state exemption values appear to have higher rates of chapter 7 filings relative 
to chapter 13 than those with lower exemptions.  Higher exemption values permit debtors to retain more 
property in chapter 7; thus, where exemption values are lower, filers must choose chapter 13 to retain 
property. 
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that are not found on a balance sheet.  The initiation of a bankruptcy case imposes an 
automatic stay against all efforts by creditors to collect prepetition debts.22  Indeed, 
Professor Jean Braucher reports that the primary goal of bankruptcy filers is “stopping 
creditors’ collection efforts (foreclosure, repossession, suit, garnishment, phone calls, 
letters, home visits).”23  Second on the list is “keeping property, often serving as 
collateral, such as homes, cars and household belongings.”24  Thus, bankruptcy 
procedures such as the automatic stay provide additional economic benefit for filing 
bankruptcy above and beyond the discharge itself.25 
The substantial benefits provided by the current bankruptcy system essentially has 
created a sort of arbitrage opportunity for many to gain financially by filing bankruptcy, 
and the rising bankruptcy rates of recent years provides evidence that this arbitrage 
opportunity is gradually being recognized and exploited by bankruptcy filers.  The steady 
upward trend in bankruptcy filing rates, rather than an immediate jump, is also consistent 
with NIE theory.  There are substantial information and transaction costs associated with 
learning about and filing personal bankruptcy, which means that consumer response to 
the existing arbitrage opportunity will tend to be gradual, rather than immediate, as 
information percolates through the system.  This will especially be the case for a rare and 
relatively risky event such as the decision to file bankruptcy. 
                                                 
22 11 U.S.C. §362(a). 
23 Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L. J. 
501, 522 (1993). 
24 Id. 
25 See Sugato Chakravarty and Eun-Young Rhee, Factors Affecting an Individual’s Bankruptcy Filing 
Decision, Working Paper, Purdue University (May 4, 1999) (reporting survey data that second-most 
common reason for filing bankruptcy was in response to lawsuits and collection harassment); see also 
“People Behind Bankruptcy Numbers: Preliminary Results of Chapter 13 Study in Progress,” Testimony 
Before the Subcomm. On Admin. Oversight and the Court of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th 
Cong. At *6 (1998) (testimony of Professor Tahira K. Hira), available in 1998 WL 8992993 (reporting 
results of survey of bankruptcy filers who state that “no more phone calls from creditors” is a leading 
reason for filing bankruptcy). 
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Economists have modeled the spread of knowledge of an economic opportunity as 
following an S-shaped curve.26  At first an innovation is adopted only by those who have 
a large amount to gain from the innovation and are willing to bear the risk of the 
innovation, and so the spread of information is slow.  But at some point the awareness of 
the new higher-level equilibrium becomes apparent to others, and knowledge spreads 
quickly through the economy until the new equilibrium level is reached.  Where the gain 
from adopting the new knowledge is high or the cost of adopting it is low, the knowledge 
will be expected to spread more rapidly.27 
In a pathbreaking article examining the diffusion of information through the 
economy and society, economist Zvi Griliches modeled the spread of information 
through the American farm belt of the development of high-yield hybrid corn during the 
mid-Twentieth Century.28  When adopted, hybrid corn increased productivity by 300 to 
1,000 per cent.29  Nonetheless, hybrid corn was not introduced immediately or at the 
same time in all parts of the country.  Rather, its introduction ranged from the mid-1930s 
in Iowa to the mid-1940s in Alabama, with several intermediate states.  Once introduced 
into a region, however, the diffusion of knowledge of hybrid corn followed a nearly-
identical S-shaped curve in each area introduced, starting slow, then moving dramatically 
upward before leveling off at a new higher equilibrium.  Once the information was first 
                                                 
26 See Zvi Griliches, Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technological Change, 25 
ECONOMETRICA 501 (1957).  See also Pauline M. Ippolito and Richard A. Ippolito, Measuring the Value of 
Life Savings from Consumer Reactions to New Information, 25 J. PUB. ECON. 53 (1984); Richard A. 
Ippolito, R. Dennis Murphy, and Donald Sant, Staff Report on Consumer Reponses to Cigarette Health 
Information (Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, Aug. 1979) (observing gradual spread of knowledge 
to consumers regarding health information about cigarettes). 
27 Griliches, Hybrid Corn, supra note 26, at 522. 
28 See id.; see also Zvi Griliches, Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn and Related 
Innovations, 66 J. POL. ECON. 419 (1958).  For a more modern application of Griliches’s model to 
innovation activity see Michael R. Darby and Lynne G. Zucker, Grilichesian Breakthroughs: Inventions of 
Methods of Inventing and Firm Entry in Nanotechnology, NBER Working Paper 9825, available in 
http://www.nber.org/papers.w9825. 
29 Griliches, Hybrid Corn, supra note 26, at 521 n.43. 
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made available, Griliches observed, a predictable adjustment path followed that showed 
some short-term variation, but which over time exhibited more or less uniform movement 
toward a new equilibrium path. 
It is interesting that Figure 1 above, which plots a curve of bankruptcy filing rates 
over the past half century, resembles Griliches’s S-shaped curve of transmission of 
information across the economy, rising gradually at first but then accelerating over time.  
There appears to be a more or less consistent march to a higher equilibrium level of 
consumer bankruptcy filings, such that at some point the curve will level off at a new 
higher equilibrium level, whatever that may be.  The new equilibrium has not yet been 
reached, but the long-term trend line in bankruptcy filings is exhibiting a predictable rise 
toward a new higher equilibrium level. 
The Bankruptcy Code provides a type of economic profit opportunity because 
many people could benefit financially by declaring bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy filers can 
protect substantial property through property exemptions.  Moreover, because of the 
property-based nature of bankruptcy exemptions, this benefit rises as household wealth 
rises.30  Because a chapter 7 discharge protects future income from creditors, the value of 
this benefit also rises as income rises.31  In other words, both high wealth and high 
income households have the largest potential benefit from filing bankruptcy. 
                                                 
30 This is because rather than giving a general dollar allowance for exempt property, exemption regimes 
enumerate specific exempt property that is thought necessary to the debtor’s fresh start, such as houses, 
automobiles, and retirement plans.  In practice, middle class families are more likely to own this sort of 
property and have higher values than lower-income households, thus the property-based nature of the 
exemption regime tends to favor upper-income debtors. 
31 See 11 U.S.C. §541(a)(6).  An individual’s future income stream constitutes the most valuable asset for 
the overwhelming number of people.  See Buckley, American Fresh Start, supra note 16, at 67; James 
Davies and John Whally, Taxes and Capital Formation: How Important is Human Capital?, NBER 
Working Paper No. 2899 (1989). 
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But individuals with large amounts of debt will also benefit from filing 
bankruptcy.  The greater the amount of household debt, the greater will be the benefit of 
being able to discharge debt.  In fact, there is an observable correlation between 
household debt levels and consumer bankruptcy filings.32  Adherents to the traditional 
model have assumed that this correlation implies a determinate causal direction, and have 
posited that consumer debt is an exogenous variable that causes bankruptcy filings as an 
endogenous variable.  But the causal link more plausibly runs the other way.  It is 
unlikely that debt levels are chosen wholly exogenously by consumers; rather, debt levels 
are partly endogenous, reflecting the ease with which these obligations can be discharged 
in bankruptcy.33    In turn, high levels of household debt increase the economic benefit of 
filing bankruptcy by permitting the discharge of more debt.34  As total debt rises, 
bankruptcy becomes more attractive, because it increases the benefit received from a 
bankruptcy discharge.  The benefits rise still further in a system like the American 
bankruptcy system, which permits bankruptcy filers to pick and choose which debts they 
want to pay, providing the option, for instance, to reaffirm some debts (such as mortgages 
and car loans) but to discharge others (such as credit cards).35  If causation ran in the 
direction postulated by the traditional model, then the correlation between debt and 
bankruptcy should also be reflected in more conventional measures of indebtedness, such 
                                                 
32 See Robert M. Lawless, The Relationship Between Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Filings and Various Basic 
Measures of Consumer Debt, available in 
http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/rlawless/busbkr/body_filings.htm at 9.  The relationship between total 
debt and bankruptcy filings is similar.  See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, 
Chapter 1, p. 85 (1996). 
33 See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1. 
34 See Chakravarty and Rhee, supra note 25, at 12 (finding increase in likelihood of individual filing 
bankruptcy as benefit rises, as measured in terms of dollar amount of debts discharged under bankruptcy 
protection net of non-exempt property). 
35 See Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy’s New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt 
Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415 (1999). 
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as the debt-service ratio and balance sheet insolvency, which account for factors such as 
interest rates and household assets.  But it is not. 36  The correlation between debt and 
bankruptcy is apparent, but the causal explanation proposed by the traditional model 
appears to be incorrect. 
The assertion of the traditional model, that consumer debt provides a causal 
explanation of the bankruptcy filing rate, is a classic manifestation of the ex post ergo 
propter hoc fallacy37—namely, that the observed correlation supports the asserted causal 
relationship.  But there is no a priori reason to assume that causation runs in the direction 
assumed by the traditional model, nor is there corroborating empirical evidence to 
support this causal inference.  The correlation between total debt and bankruptcy, 
therefore, is more plausibly attributed to the increased benefit that this provides for 
highly-indebted consumers to file bankruptcy to gain the relief of the bankruptcy 
discharge.  Reducing the benefits of bankruptcy, therefore, probably would decrease both 
household debt levels and bankruptcy filings. 
2. The Role of Property Exemptions 
At the same time, the 1978 Code enlarged one of the more important benefits 
governing bankruptcy filings, the structure of property exemptions in bankruptcy.38  
Exemptions govern the amount of property, and what types of property, a debtor can 
retain when she files bankruptcy.  Moreover, exemption law has traditionally been a 
creature of state law, rather than federal law.  The 1978 Code, however, added an 
additional slate of federal exemptions, giving filers a choice of exemption regimes, 
                                                 
36 See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1. 
37 See James Tobin, Money and Income: Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc? 84 Q. J. ECON. 301, 302-03 (1970) 
(discussing perils of inferring determinate causal relationships from correlations). 
38 See Barry Adler, Ben Polak, and Alan Schwartz, Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical 
Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 608-09 (2000). 
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except in states that have opted-out of the federal menu and require debtors to use the 
state exemption regime instead.39  The Code therefore left unaffected the exemption 
regimes in place for filers in opt-out states, but increased the benefits for those filers who 
now have a choice between the state and federal slates of exemptions. 
State variation in exemptions means that the relative economic benefits accruing 
to debtors from filing bankruptcy will vary across the country.40  Debtors in states with 
more generous exemption law regimes will be able to keep more property in bankruptcy 
than those in states with less generous exemption laws.  As a result, debtors living in 
more generous exemption states will have a greater incentive at the margin to file 
bankruptcy relative to debtors living in less-generous exemption states.  There is some 
empirical evidence that individuals do respond to these incentives, and that more 
generous exemption laws lead to increased bankruptcy filings at the margin.41  Moreover, 
there appears to have been a tendency for property exemptions to rise in recent years, 
both by a steady increase in the dollar value of exemptions (several states have created 
homestead exemptions or increased the cap on their homestead exemptions in recent 
years), as well as through the creation and recognition of new categories of exempt 
property, especially new or expanded exemptions for retirement accounts.42 
                                                 
39 11 U.S.C. §522. 
40 See Eric A. Posner, Richard Hynes, and Anup Malani, The Political Economy of Property Exemption 
Laws, 47 J. L. & ECON. 19 (2004). 
41 See White, Why It Pays to File, supra note 20, at 685.  On the other hand, although the impact of 
exemptions is positive, it appears to be modest in magnitude, probably because residents of high-
exemption states generally have less access to credit ex ante, which dampens some of direct benefit of 
filing.  See Note, Reformed Economic, supra note 14, at 1347 (1996) (summarizing studies); Kartik 
Athreya, Fresh Start or Head Start? Uniform Bankruptcy Exemptions and Welfare (working paper, Aug. 
12, 2003); see also Reint Gropp, John Karl Scholz, and Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and 
Credit Supply and Demand, 112 Q. J. ECON. 217 (1997) (finding that credit is more expensive and less 
available in high-exemption states). 
42 For a comprehensive survey of state policies related to exemptions, see C. Scott Pryor, Rock, Scissors, 
Paper: ERISA, The Bankruptcy Code and State Exemption Laws for Individual Retirement Accounts, 77 
AM. BANKR. L. J. 65 (2003). 
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This expansion in exemptions may explain some of the increase in consumer 
bankruptcy filings, especially when combined with other developments.  Household 
wealth and household bankruptcies have both increased dramatically during the past few 
decades.  Household wealth has exploded, going through several periods of rapid wealth 
accumulation.43  In fact, after remaining relatively stable for over half a century, 
household net wealth began to rise rapidly in the 1970s, accelerated in the 1908s, and 
exploded in the 1990s.  At the same time, consumer bankruptcy filings also rose steadily 
and dramatically during that same time.  In the mid-1990s, for example, household net 
wealth grew by about ten percent per year, even as consumer bankruptcies jumped as 
much as twenty percent per year.  Moreover, the ratio of consumer credit to household 
net worth has remained almost perfectly constant at four percent of net worth since 
1956.44  This combination of rising bankruptcies and rising personal wealth contradicts 
the hypothesis that mounting bankruptcies reflects increased household financial distress, 
but is consistent with the view that consumers can shield more wealth in bankruptcy.  The 
sources of the rise in net wealth have varied over time, but in general, there have been 
large rises in the value of residential real estate (throughout the period) and financial 
assets (especially during the stock market boom of the 1990s).45   
The steady increase in home property values over the past thirty years has 
increased the effective of the homestead exemption by increasing the amount of wealth 
                                                 
43 See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1. 
44 See Thomas A. Durkin, in THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT at 35, 40 and 40, Fig. 4  
(Thomas A. Durkin and Michael E. Staten eds., 2001).  Not coincidentally, this ratio is also consistent with 
the long run estimated marginal propensity to consume out of household wealth, which has been stable 
between 3-5% for many years.  See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1. 
45 See Joanna H. Frodin, Commentary: Is the Savings Rate Really Negative?, 
http://www.phil.frb.org/src/specialstudies/cfarticle1.html (identifying three distinct consumer wealth 
“booms” over past 30 years); William G. Gale & John Sabelhaus, Perspectives on the Household Saving 
Rate, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 181, 200-02 (William C. Brainerd and George L. 
Perry eds., 1999). 
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available to be protected in bankruptcy.  Some cases involving homestead exemptions 
have been quite egregious, allowing debtors to pour massive amounts of wealth into a 
homestead exempt in bankruptcy, often on the eve of bankruptcy.46  In practice, however, 
the impact of the unlimited homestead exemption on bankruptcy filings is relatively 
trivial.  Fay, Hurst, and White, for instance, conclude that were a cap of $100,000 to be 
imposed on the amount of equity one could protect in a homestead, this would reduce 
bankruptcy filings only about 6,000 per year (out of 1.5 million).47  The reason for this is 
obvious—few bankruptcy filers have more than $100,000 in equity in their homes.  On 
the other hand, the aggregate effect of all homestead exemptions across the country is 
significant.48 
The increase in wealth from the increased value in financial assets also has 
increased the effective value of bankruptcy-exempt retirement plans.49  Although there is 
little systematic empirical evidence on the effect of more generous treatment of 
retirement savings on bankruptcy filing rates, anecdotal evidence through case filings 
suggest that it is becoming increasingly common for bankruptcy filers to have substantial 
amounts of excepted or exempt pension plans at the time of filing bankruptcy.  One 
Bankruptcy Judge observed in a case a few years ago, “[N]otwithstanding that many 
debtors have such substantial unsecured consumer debt, few seem to own (or report) any 
significant non-exempt tangible personal property, but many report substantial exempt 
                                                 
46 See GAO Finds Some Florida and Texas Debtors Have Expensive Homes, CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, 
Aug. 12, 1999, at 1, 6; Protecting Rich Bankrupts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, at A-20. 
47 Fay, Hurst, and White, supra note 19, at 715-16. 
48 See Andreas Lehnert & Dean M. Maki, Consumption, Debt, and Portfolio Choice: Testing the Effect of 
Bankruptcy Law at 31, Federal Reserve Board (Working paper, Feb. 2002) (concluding that reducing all 
state homestead exemptions to average level of lowest quartile of states would be predicted to reduce 
filings by 18%). 
49 See 11 U.S.C. §510(c); Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992). 
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retirement funds (IRA, 401K or Keough accounts).”50  In that case, for instance, one of 
the debtors was a successful doctor who had amassed interests in IRA, ERISA, Keough, 
and other exempt pension plans of over $390,000, and nonetheless sought relief in 
Chapter 7.51  The Bankruptcy Court took the debtor’s large exempt pension assets into 
account in dismissing the case for substantial abuse, a decision that was later affirmed by 
the Second Circuit.52  Other cases have involved Chapter 7 debtors who had accumulated 
$200,000,53 $285,000,54 and $96,00055 in exempt pension plans that were either excepted 
or exempt in bankruptcy.  In another case, a doctor filed bankruptcy after being sued for 
$160 million in damages from the debtor’s intentional sexual abuse.  The debtor proposed 
a Chapter 13 plan to pay them $45,000 over a five-year plan period.  At the same time, he 
held three exempt IRA accounts with a total value of $1.4 million.  The court held that 
debtor was not required to include any of the $1.4 million or income derived from it in 
his “disposable income” for purposes of his plan payment obligations.56  This 
combination of rising financial assets and expanding exemptions for retirement plans has 
increased the financial benefit of filing bankruptcy, especially for wealthier debtors. 
B. The Economic Costs of Filing Bankruptcy Have Fallen 
The economic costs of learning about and filing bankruptcy also have fallen over 
time, thereby increasing bankruptcies.  This cost reduction has taken a number of 
different forms, including reductions in the search costs of learning about bankruptcy and 
                                                 
50 In re Carlton, 211 B.R. 468, 475 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y., 1997). 
51 Carlton, 211 B.R. at 468. 
52 Kornfield v. Schwartz, 164 F.3d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that even though the pension plan was 
exempt property, the Bankruptcy Court acted within its discretion in considering it under the totality of the 
circumstances test for substantial abuse). 
53 In re Summer, 255 B.R. 555, 558 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio, 2000). 
54 In re Dabbas, 2000 WL 33672948 (Bankr. D. Utah, Aug. 24, 2000).  The court made no mention of the 
pension in dismissing the case for substantial abuse. 
55 In re Haddad, 246 B.R. 27, 35 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2000). 
56 Solomon v. Cosby, 67 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir. 1995) 
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the transaction costs of filing bankruptcy.  At the same time, increases in the availability 
of sub-prime and home equity secured lending have reduced the costs of obtaining credit 
following bankruptcy.  These various reductions in the costs of filing bankruptcy have 
also increased incentives at the margin toward higher bankruptcy filing rates. Given the 
substantial economic benefits available to bankruptcy filers, even a small decline in the 
relative costs of filing bankruptcy could be expected to elicit a substantial increase in the 
number of bankruptcy filings.57 
It should be stressed at the outset that a decline in search and transaction costs for 
filing bankruptcy is a good thing from an economic perspective, even though it increases 
bankruptcy filings.  The relevant policy concern is not the total number of bankruptcy 
filings per se, but rather an efficient level of bankruptcy filings that accurately matches 
actual bankruptcy filings with those who society determines should be entitled to 
bankruptcy relief, while limiting fraud and abuse.  Rationing access by high search and 
transaction costs, therefore, furthers no coherent or persuasive goal as a matter of social 
policy.  Leaving aside the normative question of where to draw this line between access 
and minimizing abuse, it is first necessary to understand as a positive question how 
reduced search and transaction costs translate into increased bankruptcy filings. 
1. Declining Search Costs 
As noted, bankruptcy relief can be extremely beneficial to many of those who file, 
and many American families could benefit financially by filing bankruptcy.  But there are 
also costs associated with pursuing bankruptcy.  Most notably, debtors must become 
aware of bankruptcy as an option and the benefits it provides.  Because information about 
                                                 
57 See David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, An Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and 
Delinquency, 15 REV. FIN. STUD.  319, 320 (2002). 
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the benefits of bankruptcy is not free, a debtor must undertake some effort to learn about 
bankruptcy and to educate herself about the benefits of bankruptcy before filing.  In 
economics, this concept is referred to as “search costs.”  As the search costs of learning 
about bankruptcy relief fall debtors will tend to increase their demand for bankruptcy, 
thereby increasing the number of bankruptcies.  Today individuals receive information 
about bankruptcy from a large variety of sources: attorney advertising, celebrity reports, 
and from friends and family, all of which suggests that the search costs of bankruptcy 
have fallen in recent years. 
Attorney advertising about bankruptcy is much more widespread than in the 
past.58  There is some evidence that the extent of attorney advertising of bankruptcy 
services is correlated with the number of bankruptcy filings in the relevant community, 
but the direction of the causal influence is ambiguous.59  On the other hand, there is 
ample empirical evidence that in general attorney advertising tends to increase the 
demand for lawyers’ services.60  There is no reason to believe that demand for 
bankruptcy would be inconsistent with this general model, which suggests that 
                                                 
58 Coincidentally, at almost the same time the Code was amended, the Supreme Court held that attorney 
advertising is commercial speech protected by the First Amendment, thereby legalizing attorney 
advertising.  See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
59 SMR Research “did a brief study of telephone book ads and found that cities with high bankruptcy filing 
rates usually do have higher levels of lawyer advertising than cities with low filing rates.”  See The Rise in 
Personal Bankruptcy: Causes and Impact, Before the Subcomm. On Commercial and Admin. Law of the 
House Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th Cong. At *18-19 (1998) (testimony of Stuart A. Feldstein, President 
of SMR Research), available in 1998 WL 105080.  The causal link is ambiguous, however, because it is 
not clear whether these lawyers are responding to extant demand for attorney services to file bankruptcy, 
creating demand for bankruptcy filings through informative advertising, or both. 
60 See WILLIAM J. JACOBS, ET AL., IMPROVING CONSUMER ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES: THE CASE FOR 
REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON TRUTHFUL ADVERTISING 172 FTC Staff Report (1984); Terry Calvani, 
James Lagenfeld, & Gordon Shuford, Attorney Advertising and Competition at the Bar, 41 VAND. L. REV. 
761 (1988); John Schroeter, Scott Smith, and Steven Cox, Advertising and Competition in Routine Legal 
Service Markets: An Empirical Investigation, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 49 (1987); Timothy J. Muris & Fred 
McChesney, Advertising and the Price and Quality of Legal Services, 1979 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 
179 (1979); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Russell G. Pearce, and Jeffrey W. Stempel, Why Lawyers Should be 
Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58  NYU L. REV. 1058 (1983); see also 
George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961); Lester G. Telser, 
Advertising and Competition, 72 J. POL ECON. 537 (1964). 
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advertising generates increased bankruptcies.61  Figure 2 is suggestive of a relationship 
between bankruptcy filings and advertising for legal services: 
Figure 2: Bankruptcy Filings and Attorney Advertising
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Source: Figure 2 and Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 
Figure 2 does not purport to demonstrate a correlation between bankruptcy filing rates 
and attorney advertising, but in the absence of systematic data on the scale of attorney 
advertising, this may be illustrative of the level of information available to consumers 
through advertising.62  On that basis, at least, it seems that there is some ground for 
                                                 
61 A study by Visa reported that 19% of bankruptcy filers learned about bankruptcy through attorney 
advertisements.  See Vern McKinley, Ballooning Bankruptcies: Issuing Blame for the Explosive Growth, 
Regulation, Fall 1997, at 33, 38. 
62 There are a number of qualifications to Figure 2 that should be noted.  First, the amount of money spent 
on attorney advertising is for all legal services, not just personal bankruptcy services.  Nonetheless, casual 
empiricism suggests that personal bankruptcy is one of the more heavily-advertised forms of legal services, 
especially on television.  Second, these figures represent only expenditures on television advertising, and 
therefore do not reflect amounts spent on other forms of media, such as radio, print, the Yellow Pages, and 
Internet.  On the other hand, personal bankruptcy advertisements are represented in those media as well, 
seemingly at least to the same extent as on television, and perhaps more.  Third, the causal link is 
indeterminate—increased attorney advertising may be a reflection of increased bankruptcy filings, rather 
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encouraging further research regarding the empirical relationship between attorney 
advertising and consumer bankruptcy filings. 
There is also anecdotal and qualitative evidence that attorney advertising probably 
increases bankruptcy filings.  Consumer bankruptcy lawyers report that they make 
substantial use of advertising in attracting new clients.63  Indeed, several of the consumer 
bankruptcy lawyers that Braucher interviewed in her 1993 study had hired marketing 
firms to shape their advertising and marketing strategies.64  At a minimum, consumer 
bankruptcy lawyers generally place display advertisements in the Yellow Pages but also 
often advertise in major newspapers.  Some even run television and radio advertisements.  
Some lawyers use direct mailings to persons whose homes have been publicly listed for 
foreclosure.  Braucher concludes that the modest investments made in advertising had 
more than recouped themselves in fees generated by clients.  Yellow Page advertisements 
are reported as the top source of clients in Braucher’s study.65 
That information costs about bankruptcy are a significant barrier to filing 
bankruptcy is evidenced in Braucher’s observation that one of the biggest difficulties for 
a lawyer meeting with a new client is persuading the client that the bankruptcy system 
truly is as generous as it seems to be, i.e., that there is no “catch.”  The ease and 
generosity of the current system defies individuals’ expectations about what could be 
expected from bankruptcy.  “People are pleasantly surprised” about what they can do in 
bankruptcy, lawyers reported.66  One lawyer observed that chapter 7 “sometimes seems to 
                                                                                                                                                 
than a cause.  Due to these necessary qualifications, it would be imprudent to draw firm conclusions from 
the observed correlation between personal bankruptcy filings and attorney advertising. 
63 Braucher, supra note 23, at 543. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 551. 
66 Id. at 553. 
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debtors to be ‘too good to be true; they can’t believe it.’”67  Some actually expressed 
concern about the implications of the widespread knowledge of bankruptcy’s benefits; 
one observed, “If Americans in general knew what you can do in bankruptcy, then we’d 
really be in trouble.”68 
A recent spate of high-profile celebrity bankruptcies has also increased public 
awareness of the benefits of bankruptcy.  The list includes celebrities such as Toni 
Braxton, Kim Basinger, Burt Reynolds, M.C. Hammer,69 and, most recently boxer Mike 
Tyson.70  Many lawyers, in fact, identify these famous bankrupts in order to persuade 
clients of the social acceptability of filing bankruptcy.71  Although the direct impact of 
this publicity is hard to measure empirically, it certainly contributes to public awareness 
of bankruptcy and increases the social acceptance of bankruptcy generally. 
Perhaps more important in increasing public awareness of the substantial benefits 
of bankruptcy is “word of mouth” as a result of the sheer number of bankruptcies itself, 
which surpassed 1.5 million households last year and continues to rise.72  The large 
numbers of bankruptcy filing means that over time most everyone has come into contact 
with the bankruptcy system either by filing themselves or by knowing a friend or family 
member who has filed.  This phenomenon is known as a “contagion” or “herding” effect 
                                                 
67 Id. at 553. 
68 Id. at 554. 
69 See Joshua Wolf Shenk, Bankrupt Policy, NEW REPUBLIC, May 18, 1998, at 16.  In fact, Mr. Hammer 
spoofed his bankruptcy filing in several recent television ads that aired during the 2005 Super Bowl. 
70 See Tyson Filing for Bankruptcy, MIAMI HERALD 17 (Aug. 3, 2003). 
71 Braucher, supra note 23, at 509 (“[Some debtors’] lawyers . . . in essence try to give their clients 
‘permission’ to opt for quick discharge in chapter 7 . . .  by naming famous people who have received a 
bankruptcy discharge.”). 
72 See Mamie Marcuss, A Look at Household Bankruptcies, COMMUNITIES & BANKING 15, 17 (Spring 
2004). 
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in economics, or less formally, as a “water cooler” effect.73  As more people file 
bankruptcy, then there are more people in the populace to tell their friends and relatives 
about the benefits of bankruptcy.  As a result, this reduces the costs of those parties in 
learning about bankruptcy, resulting in more bankruptcy filings.  This second wave of 
filers comes into contact with yet more potential filers and describe the process to them.  
This self-reinforcing dynamic creates a hydraulic upward pressure on bankruptcy filing 
rates.  Surveys of bankruptcy filers reveals that friends and family are the single most 
important source of information about bankruptcy and that a majority of bankruptcy filers 
knew a friend or family member who had filed bankruptcy.74  Consistent with the model, 
this number of people who first heard about filing bankruptcy from a personal 
acquaintance also seems to rising over time.75 
2. Declining Transaction Costs 
The transaction costs associated with filing bankruptcy have also declined in 
recent years, in major part as an outgrowth of the increase in filings.  A large and steady 
flow of consumer bankruptcy filings has made possible the establishment of certain 
economies of scale and specialization that decrease the marginal cost of processing 
bankruptcy cases, such as capital investments in electronic technology and specialized 
                                                 
73 See also Fay, Hurst, & White, supra note 19, at n.13 (“information flows from early filers could cause 
non-filers to revise their estimates of the costs of bankruptcy downward, so that they become more likely 
to file”). 
74 See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3, at 212-13 (summarizing studies); Braucher, supra note 23, at 544 
(reporting that many client referrals come from more people telling relatives, friends, and co-workers about 
their bankruptcies); See McKinley, supra note 61, at 38 (noting results of Gallup poll, which found that 51 
percent of bankruptcy filers had a close friend or relative who filed bankruptcy previously and Visa survey 
of bankruptcy filers that found that 45 percent of filers learned about bankruptcy from friends or family). 
75 See Bankruptcy Law Revision Before the Subcomm. On Commercial and Admin. Law of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. At *8 (1998) (testimony of Mallory B. Duncan, Vice-President, 
General Counsel of National Retail Federation), available in1998 WL 8993460 (“[O]ne recent study 
found a five hundred percent increase in less than two years in the number of filers who say they first 
heard about the idea of filing from a friend or relative.”). 
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paralegals that reduce the marginal cost of filing bankruptcy cases.  As the costs of 
processing bankruptcy cases fall, demand for bankruptcies will tend to rise. 
In particular, so-called bankruptcy “mills” have evolved, that produce bankruptcy 
cases as largely standardized commodities.  Their practice is a high-volume, repetitive 
one.  Making heavy use of technology that allows them to generate “cookie cutter” 
bankruptcy pleadings, these mills have been able to drive down the cost of filing 
bankruptcy substantially.  Using teams of paralegals and secretaries to supplement their 
efforts, these attorneys represent hundreds of debtors per year.76  Most lawyers in high-
volume practices meet only once with the client before filing a bankruptcy petition; few 
meet more than twice.77  For those who do not want to or cannot pay for a lawyer, “do-it-
yourself” bankruptcy books have become a staple of bookstores and even grocery store 
check-out lines.  Huge amounts of information about bankruptcy is also available on the 
Internet, including all of the forms needed to file bankruptcy. 
The high volume of consumer bankruptcy filings has made it possible for certain 
lawyers to establish practices focused on high-volume, repetitive cases.78  This 
specialization has allowed these firms to realize economies of scale and to make capital 
investments that have driven down the marginal cost of filing bankruptcy. 79  As these 
                                                 
76 In 1981, only 4% of debtors were not represented by attorney.  See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE 
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 23 (1989).  By 1991-92, 
however, paralegals in one California district prepared 14% of consumer filings.  See Susan Block-Lieb, A 
Comparison of Pro Bono Representation Programs for Consumer Debtors, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
37, 40 (1994); Geraldine Mund, Paralegals: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 337, 340-41 (1994). 
77 Braucher, supra note 23, at 554. 
78 This development in the economics of legal practice is not unique to bankruptcy.  Similar developments 
have occurred in many other areas of legal practice.  See David A. Hyman and Charles Silver, And Such 
Small Portions: Limited Performance Agreements and the Cost/Quality/Access Trade-Off, 11 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 959, 975-77 (1998). 
79 I have not located any direct evidence on changes in the price of filing bankruptcy over time, but it is 
generally accepted that this is the case and I have seen no evidence inconsistent with that observation.  See 
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transaction costs of filing bankruptcy have fallen, this decreased price has created 
incentives for higher bankruptcy filing rates.  The large number of filings has also 
indirectly increased the benefits of filing.  A “substantial abuse” action under section 
707(b), for instance, can be brought only by the United States Trustee or a Bankruptcy 
Judge; thus the rising number of filings dramatically decreases the scrutiny that can be 
applied to any particular case, increasing the possibility of abuse. 
3. Greater Availability of Post-Bankruptcy Credit 
Traditionally a major cost of filing bankruptcy was the negative effect it had on 
access to credit following bankruptcy.80  Indeed, traditionally it was perceived that filing 
bankruptcy would cripple the ability to acquire new credit following bankruptcy.  Today, 
however, there have been changes in credit markets that have made credit more available 
to former bankruptcy filers.  One survey done a decade ago found that over 16 percent of 
bankruptcy filers were able to gain unsecured credit within one year after filing 
bankruptcy and over 55 percent within five years.81  A more recent survey finds that 
three-quarters of bankruptcy filers have at least one credit card within a year after filing.82   
Bankruptcy filers are able to gain access to a broad cross-section of revolving credit, such 
as bank cards, department stores, gas cards, and finance companies, as well as installment 
lenders.83  In fact, that figure would probably be higher today as a result of the growth in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy (working paper); see 
also Buckley & Brinig, supra note 16, at 195; Gross & Souleles, supra note 57. 
80 Today, filing bankruptcy remains on one’s credit rating for ten years.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1). 
81 See Michael Staten, The Impact of Post-Bankruptcy Credit on the Number of Personal Bankruptcies 10-
11, Credit Research Center, Krannert Graduate School of Management Working Paper, No. 58, Purdue 
University (1993).  Staten argues that for various reasons this estimate probably underestimated access to 
credit at that time.   
82 VISA, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY: ANNUAL BANKRUPTCY DEBTOR SURVEY (1997). 
83 Staten, Impact, supra note 81, at 11-12. 
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the subprime lending market which has created an entire industry that caters to 
consumers with damaged credit. 
The traditional belief that bankruptcy filing would restrict access to credit 
following bankruptcy no longer constrains a debtor’s behavior to the degree it once did.  
To be sure, the debtor will likely suffer some penalty as a result of having a bankruptcy 
filing on her credit rating.  Nonetheless, developments in credit markets means that this 
hardship is no longer as severe as it once may have been.  As a result, this too has 
reduced the effective costs associated with declaring bankruptcy. 
 
III. Changes in Social and Personal Norms Regarding Bankruptcy 
Increasing bankruptcy filing rates can also be explained by changes in social and 
personal norms regarding bankruptcy.  There is a widespread perception that bankruptcy 
has lost some of its previous social stigma, and that this has contributed to the increase in 
bankruptcy filing rates.84  Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, for instance, has 
stated bluntly, “Personal bankruptcies are soaring because Americans have lost their 
sense of shame.”85  The impact of a decline in personal shame and social stigma on 
bankruptcy filing rates is straightforward.  A reduction in the generalized social stigma 
associated with filing bankruptcy will reduce the negative impact that a particular 
individual will suffer to his personal reputation from filing bankruptcy, making 
individuals more willing to file.  As bankruptcy becomes a less socially stigmatized 
                                                 
84 For instance, in his floor statement on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, Senator Charles Grassley 
referred to a public opinion poll that indicated that fully 85% of Americans believe that bankruptcy has 
less social stigma than in previous eras.  Professor Braucher also quotes numerous lawyers who opine that 
the increase in bankruptcy filing rates has been driven in part by a decline in the traditional social stigma 
associated with filing bankruptcy.  See Braucher, supra note 23, at 540; id. at 545.  See also Charles A. 
Luckett, Personal Bankruptcies, in IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 44, at 69, 73 (“It is widely 
recognized, though hard to measure, that the stigma of bankruptcy is not what it used to be . . .”). 
85 Quoted in Julie Kosterlitz, Over the Edge, 29 NAT’L J. 870, 871 (1997). 
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activity, the reputational harm from filing bankruptcy falls as well, creating a vicious 
cycle of eroding norms and rising bankruptcy filings.  In fact, it is not even necessary that 
there is a decline in the actual stigma attached to filing bankruptcy, so long as potential 
bankruptcy filers perceive that there has been a reduction in the stigma attached to filing 
bankruptcy. 
A. Consequences of Change in Social Norms Regarding Bankruptcy 
The negative social and economic effect of changes in social norms regarding 
bankruptcy is amplified because it disproportionately affects a discrete category of 
individuals who have the most to gain financially by filing.  Under current bankruptcy 
law, the economic benefits of filing bankruptcy tend to rise as the filer’s income and 
wealth rises because exemptions are linked to specified types of property deemed 
essential to the debtor’s fresh start, such as houses, cars, and other such property.86  
Because the financial benefit of bankruptcy is largest for high-income and high-wealth 
debtors, the importance of social norms in restraining bankruptcy filing is highest also for 
this same group.  If those constraints weaken, therefore, the impact at the margin in terms 
of higher filings will be largest for high-income and high-wealth individuals. 
Although the theory is straightforward, empirically measuring changes in broad 
and diffuse social factors such as shame and stigma is difficult and do not easily lend 
themselves to direct testing.87  For instance, it is not methodologically correct to simply 
ask bankruptcy filers whether they felt “ashamed” or perceived social disapproval from 
                                                 
86 See supra note 30-31 and accompanying text. 
87 See Luckett, Personal Bankruptcies, supra note 84, at 76 (noting that “none of the typically cited social 
or legal factors are easily quantifiable”); Gross and Souleles, supra note 57, at 321 (“The various costs of 
default, especially social, legal, and information costs, are inherently difficult to measure.  Most of the 
proxies that have been suggested run into problems of endogeneity and reverse causality.”); See David A. 
Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or Both?, 73 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 311, 326 (1999) (“stigma is very difficult to measure”). 
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filing bankruptcy.88  For purposes of the stigma-bankruptcy connection it is completely 
beside the point whether people feel bad about bankruptcy after they actually file; what 
matters is whether the stigma is sufficiently strong to deter them from filing at all, or 
perhaps even more importantly, to encourage them to live a sufficiently prudent life such 
that financial crises is less likely.  The argument is that the constraining effect of shame 
and stigma has gradually declined at the margin, reducing the psychological cost of filing 
bankruptcy making some people more willing to file than they otherwise would be, not 
that the shame and stigma associated with bankruptcy have been completely eliminated 
or that those who actually file bankruptcy do not feel ashamed anymore. 
A direct test of the effect of personal shame and social stigma on bankruptcy 
filings, therefore, is essentially impossible—it would require identifying those marginal 
individuals who would have filed bankruptcy but for the negative effect on his 
conscience or reputation from doing so.  Because these individuals never show up in 
bankruptcy court, it is almost impossible to identify this group of people for research 
purposes.  Even more difficult to identify would be that category of individuals who 
respond to the reduced shame associated with bankruptcy by living more closely to the 
financial edge than they otherwise would.  Nonetheless, if social norms have changed, 
there is little doubt that would lead to increased filings. 
Social norms are a low-cost mechanism for promoting social order and 
discouraging anti-social behavior.  Norms substitute for more formal economic, political, 
and social institutions, such as police and courts.  For instance, a society that develops 
                                                 
88 Nonetheless, some scholars have done exactly that.  See, e.g., Constance M. Kilmark, Inside the World of 
the Troubled Debtor, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRACTICE 257 (2001); see also ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA 
WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING 
BROKE 73-75 (2003); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN, & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE 
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 32 (2000). 
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and maintains a social norm against property theft (in addition to having a police force 
that prevents theft) will achieve more order at less expense than a society that can prevent 
theft only through the maintenance of a large police force with no norm against theft.89  
Moreover, in order to attain the same degree of social harmony, it will be necessary to 
support a larger police force in the latter society as compared to the former.  A reduction 
in the constraining force of a prosocial norm, therefore, will impose costs on society, both 
in the form of reduced social harmony and lower levels of economic exchange, as well as 
a the expense of constructing and operating more formal institutions, such as police.   
It is difficult to quantify the full costs to the American economy and society of the 
decline in social norms against bankruptcy.  The experience of Memphis, Tennessee, 
however, is suggestive.90  In 1996, 4.3% of Memphis families filed bankruptcy, almost 1 
in 23, earning Memphis the sobriquet of the “bankruptcy capital of America.”  According 
to a Fortune magazine article, there is a “culture of bankruptcy” in Memphis, and 
bankruptcy is “a way of life.”  As the magazine notes, “Because so many people have 
lived through bankruptcy, there’s a strong informal support network for anyone in 
financial trouble.  Friends and neighbors tell each other ‘bankruptcy works,’ says David 
Monypenny, Jerry Lee Lewis’s [who also filed for bankruptcy] manager.”  Other indicia 
of an active bankruptcy culture are prominent.  The article continues, “There’s also 
plenty of professional support for bankruptcy: The Memphis Yellow Pages features more 
than a dozen large lawyers’ ads offering to wipe out debts for no down payment; a Honda 
                                                 
89 An analogy is the well-established finding that voluntary norms of tax compliance substantially reduce 
the amount of resources that the Internal Revenue Service has to expend on audits, enforcement, litigation, 
and other compliance measures.  If voluntary tax compliance were to fall, this would require greater 
expenditures on enforcement tax-compliance by the federal government.  See Eric A. Posner, Law and 
Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781 (2000); James Andreoni et al., Tax 
Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818 (1998). 
90 Kim Clark, Why So Many Americans Are Going Bankrupt, FORTUNE, Aug. 4, 1997, at 24. 
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dealer (its slogan: ‘The bankruptcy specialists’) runs TV commercials promising to sell 
you a car no matter what your credit history.”  But the costs are also significant.  
Consider Fortune’s description of everyday financial life in Memphis: “It’s almost 
impossible to cash checks in Memphis.  Used-car dealers charge their wholesale cost as a 
down payment.  And lenders are either tightening or giving up.  First Enterprise Financial 
Group, for instance, an Illinois-based sub-prime lender, closed its Memphis operations in 
May.”91 
As this example suggests, a decline in norms discouraging bankruptcy thus has 
two effects: a deadweight loss from the reduction of mutually-beneficial trades as well as 
a reduction in economic efficiency as a result of increasing use of “self-help” ex ante 
measures by lenders to offset the lower reliability of financial contracts.  Given the 
variety of possible responses, it may be difficult to estimate the full social loss that results 
form these various offsetting costs.  More formal institutional responses, such as large 
downpayments and higher interest rates can provide some response to fill the vacuum 
created by the breakdown of informal bonds of trust.  But these deadweight losses and ex 
ante adjustment costs fall on innocent and opportunistic borrowers alike. 
B. Empirical Evidence of Effects of Changes in Norms on Filings 
Because of the inability to measure changes in social norms directly, indirect 
proxies have been used to try test for the effect of changes in social stigma regarding 
bankruptcy, primarily by trying to isolate the features of “bankruptcy cultures” that 
exhibit persistently high filing rates after controlling for other economically relevant 
                                                 
91 Clark, supra note 90, at 24. 
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variables.92  Using district-level date, Fay, Hurst, and White find that after controlling for 
other relevant variables, there are systematic patterns of higher filing rates in particular 
districts, either because the higher level of filings increases information about bankruptcy 
or because the prevalence of bankruptcy in the community reduces the stigma attached to 
filing.93  Gross and Souleles use similar statistical measures, and similarly find that after 
controlling for economic risk, the probability that a given individual will file for 
bankruptcy is in part a function of the number of people who filed for bankruptcy in the 
recent past in that community.94  This correlation in filing rates that cannot be explained 
by economic risk variables suggests the presence of a stigma or information effect in 
local communities that explain bankruptcy filing rates.95 
Empiricists also have tried to test for the effect of stigma on bankruptcy filings by 
examining proxy variables that can serve as quantifiable proxies for the strength of social 
norms generally, such as by examining the size and stability of the relevant community to 
determine if bankruptcy filing rates differ according to community size.  If a fear of 
social disapproval deters bankruptcy filing, then bankruptcy filings should be higher in 
larger, more anonymous communities than in smaller communities.  Residents of larger 
communities are likely to possess less knowledge of their neighbors’ reputations and also 
                                                 
92 For a review and critique of several of the studies discussed here, see Gordon Bermant, What’s Stigma 
Got to Do with It?, ABI JOURNAL 22 (July/August 2003); see also Kartik Athreya, Shame as it Ever Was: 
Stigma and Personal Bankruptcy, 90 FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. QUARTERLY 1 (Spring 
2004) (arguing that decline in stigma increases bankruptcies but has ambiguous effect on consumer debt). 
93 See Fay, Hurst, and White, supra note 19, at 712; see also id. at 716 (“These results are consistent with 
local trends occurring in which increases in a district’s bankruptcy filing rate cause attitudes toward 
bankruptcy to become more favorable and therefore individual households’ probability of filing rise.”). 
94 See Gross and Souleles, supra note 57, at 340. 
95 Gross and Souleles, supra note 57, at 345 (“The fact that the omitted default factor rises with the number 
of people in one’s state who have previously filed for bankruptcy is suggestive of a decline in social stigma 
or information costs, but it is not conclusive.”).  Note, this same finding may also support the evidence of 
reduced information costs or the “water cooler” effect, as it is difficult to distinguish the effect of 
interpersonal transmission of information about bankruptcy from interpersonal transmission of information 
about norms. 
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less-likely to fear their disapproval.  In fact, cities with higher population densities have 
higher bankruptcy filing rates than smaller communities.96  This finding is consistent with 
more general studies that find that individuals who live in small towns tend to be both 
more trusting and more trustworthy than those from big cities.97  These factors indicate 
that norms of trust and trustworthiness are higher in small communities, suggesting that 
the conditions for trust and reciprocity to flourish (repeat-dealing and reputational 
mechanisms) are present in these communities. 
Societies with higher patterns of migration also tend to have higher bankruptcy 
filing rates, presumably because more transient populations will tend to have more 
attenuated social ties, less concern about social reputation, and weaker norms.98  Repeat 
dealings will be of shorter duration and subject to a higher discount rate than in more-
stable societies.  Where conditions make detection and monitoring of neighbors’ 
reputations difficult, social norms will be less powerful in discouraging disapproved 
behavior.  Thus, in high migration areas where individuals frequently move in and out of 
the community in a short time frame, it is difficult to punish those who behave 
improperly, thereby reducing the incentives of others to collect and act on reputational 
information. 
A final way that scholars have measured the influence of norms on bankruptcy 
rates is by the residual effect that remains after controlling for all other variables that 
might otherwise be thought to explain bankruptcy filings.  Empirical studies of 
                                                 
96 See John M. Barron, Gregory Elliehausen, and Michael E. Staten, Monitoring the Household Sector with 
Aggregate Credit Bureau Data, BUSINESS ECON. 63, 71 (Jan. 2000); see also Luckett, Personal 
Bankruptcies, supra note 84, at 85. 
97 See PETER SINGER, HOW ARE WE TO LIVE?  ETHICS IN AN AGE OF SELF-INTEREST 141 (1993); see also 
MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE 70 (2000); ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL 221-22 (1998). 
98 Buckley & Brinig, supra note 16; SULLIVAN, et al., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, supra note 76, at 
244-46. 
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bankruptcy filing rates consistently find large unexplained statistical residuals after 
controlling for all other economic variables.  These statistical residuals could result from 
a number of possible causes, but many have attributed them to a change in social norms.  
As economist Charles Luckett observes, “Of course, to the extent that a model is 
comprehensive in its incorporation of likely determinants of bankruptcy, declining stigma 
may be left as the most plausible candidate to account for the otherwise unexplained 
component of rising bankruptcies.”99 
C. Causes of Changes in Social Norms Regarding Bankruptcy 
The reasons for the erosion of the traditional stigma of filing bankruptcy are 
multiple and are hard to pin down with precision, and providing a theory of the evolution 
of social norms over time is beyond the scope of this article.  Social theorists have long 
struggled with developing a theory of how social norms are created and evolve over time, 
so any observations here are necessarily speculative.  If there has been a change in social 
norms, the explanation may rest in deep-seated changes in American culture in that have 
tended to erode the value of promise-keeping and performing one’s obligations generally, 
                                                 
99 Luckett, Personal Bankruptcies, supra note 84, at 89; see also Fay, Hurst, & White, supra note 19 
(“Although we cannot rule out the possibility that the local bankruptcy culture variables are serving as 
proxies for something else, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that social disapproval of 
bankruptcy has declined over time.”).  It may be that declining stigma may be the most plausible 
explanation for some cases but not others.  For instance, it may be that declining stigma may be the most 
important factor for middle-class and upper middle-class filers who have the most to gain financially from 
filing bankruptcy and have access to the greatest amount of information regarding bankruptcy.  With 
respect to lower-income individuals, by contrast, it may be that they are most affected by the reduction of 
transaction costs and search costs discussed above, rather than changes in social norms.  To the extent that 
disapproval of bankruptcy reflects middle-class bourgeois values, it may be more constraining on middle-
class families than poor families.  See also Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, 5 TEX. 
REV. L. & POLITICS 393, 402-08 (2001); Chapman, supra note 13, at 355  Given the difficulty of measuring 
changes in these diffuse social and economic variables in the first place, efforts to establish the relative 
importance of these variables within different demographic subgroups is even more daunting. 
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which might be reflected in changing attitudes regarding bankruptcy.100  McCloskey, for 
instance, argues that there has been a general attrition of broadly-accepted middle-class 
values of “bourgeois virtue” that praised thrift and personal responsibility, and 
condemned bankruptcy, divorce, and other behaviors.101 
With respect to bankruptcy specifically, complaints about the supposed “decline 
in stigma” regarding bankruptcy have recurred many times in American history.102  The 
question, therefore, is whether there really has been tangible a change in social norms 
regarding bankruptcy during the past 25 years, and if so, why has such a dramatic change 
occurred in such a short period of time?  Given the difficulty in understanding such broad 
social currents as changes in social norms, the discussion presented here is necessarily 
tentative.  Nonetheless, given the importance of the issue and a widespread perception 
that it is indeed an important element of the explanation of rising bankruptcies, the issue 
merits some discussion. 
One possible explanation turns on the generational change associated with the rise 
of the “Baby Boom” generation to a position of leadership in American society.103  
Changes in broad social norms tend to occur only gradually,104 but sociologist Robert 
Putnam has argued that the transition from the World War II generation to the Baby 
Boom generation marked a dramatic change in American life, and in particular, with 
                                                 
100 See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN 
DECLINE 64-65 (1997); ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 325 (1987); Buckley & 
Brinig, supra note 16. 
101 See Donald McCloskey, Bourgeois Virtue, 63 AM. SCHOLAR 177 (1994). 
102 See Moss and Johnson, supra note 87; see also LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A 
CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT (1999) (describing the recurrent “myth of lost financial virtue” 
in United States history). 
103 See Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, supra note 99, at 410-13. 
104 See JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990). 
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respect to changing attitudes of social engagement and personal responsibility.105  
Although an overgeneralization, the Baby Boom generation has been notable in its 
willingness to challenge established traditional American values, good and bad.106  Thus, 
there has general overturning of traditional taboos regarding issues as varied as marriage, 
sexuality, recreational drug use, and role of women in the economy and society.107  
Moreover, given the very size and self-confidence of the baby boom generation, they 
have arguably been able to influence social norms to a greater degree than most 
generations.  The Baby Boom generation has served as a sort of collective “norms 
entrepreneur” for widespread changes in a variety of traditional social norms.108  It may 
be that these broad social changes also tended to undermine social norms regarding 
personal financial responsibility and the social stigma associated with bankruptcy.109 
Earlier generations seem to have held a much more negative view of the personal shame 
and social stigma associated with bankruptcy than do the Baby Boomers.110  Although 
these observations fall far short of a rigorous proof of the possible relationship between 
the rise of the Baby Boom generation and the decline in stigma beginning in the 1970s 
                                                 
105 See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 249-50 (2000). 
106 See PAUL C. LIGHT, BABY BOOMERS 115-17 (1988). 
107 See Review & Outlook (Editorial), No Guardrails, WALL ST. J., at A12 (Mar. 18, 1993), available in 
1993 WL-WSJ 706182. 
108 In this vein, it has been observed that with respect to social attitudes toward divorce, “’the oldest baby 
boomers were at once deviant and trend setters . . . helped to establish new normative societal standard that 
permit a generally high rate of divorce.’”  LIGHT, supra note 106, at 147 (quoting Census Bureau experts 
Arthur Norton and Jeanne Moorman).  For more on norms entrepreneurship, albeit in a different context 
than here, see Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 10-17 (2001); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 929-30 (1996) (discussing 
“norm entrepreneurs” who can help society reach “a ‘tipping point’ when norms start to push in new 
directions”). 
109 See Michael J. Boskin and Lawrence J. Lau, An Analysis of U.S. Postwar Consumption and Saving: Part 
II Empirical Results 72-76 NBER Working Paper No. 2606 (June 1988) (finding that “vintage effect” of 
baby boom generation explains decrease in U.S. savings rates over time); but see Barry Bosworth, Gary 
Brutless, John Sabelhaus, James M. Poterba, and Lawrence H. Summers, The Decline in Saving: Evidence 
from Houshold Surveys, 1991 (No. 1) BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 183, 199 (1991) 
(arguing that cohort effect predated baby boom generation). 
110 See, e.g., TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION 39-44 (1998) (describing World War II Veteran 
Wesley Ko’s refusal to file bankruptcy); id. at 47 (describing James Dowling). 
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and 1980s, they are consistent with other characteristics of the Baby Boom generation, as 
well as providing at least one possible explanation as to the specific timing of this change 
in social norms.111 
The specific bankruptcy filing patterns of baby boomers is consistent with these 
more general observations.  Baby Boomers are dramatically over-represented in 
bankruptcy filings relative to their percentage in the population.112  Sullivan, Warren, and 
Westbrook observe, “The overrepresentation of the baby boom [in bankruptcy] is 
striking.”113  In addition, the overrepresentation of baby boomers in bankruptcy has 
following them through their economic life-cycle, indicating that the tendency toward 
bankruptcy is a reflection of factors unique to their generation, not a function of more 
generic passage through age and financial life cycle.114  When they were the 25-34 year-
old cohort of the population, they were both the largest single group in bankruptcy, as 
well as having the highest filing rate.  Ten years later, when they were aged 35-44, they 
were again the largest group in bankruptcy as well has having the highest filing rate.115  
Moreover, because the baby boomers are such a large cohort, the spike in bankruptcy 
filings among their generation counts for about 14 percent of the growth in the filing 
rates, certainly enough of a critical mass to move social norms.116  Baby Boomers have 
matured during a period of economic growth and record wealth accumulation, thus it is 
                                                 
111 See also David Frum, Bankruptcy Reform is a Moral Issue, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2000, at A14. 
112 Although Baby Boomers comprise only 39% of the American population, they are 55% of bankruptcy 
filers.  SULLIVAN, ET AL., FRAGILE, supra note 88, at 39.  In fact, the representation of Baby Boomers in 
bankruptcy may be as high as 63%, depending on the dates used to describe the Baby Boom generation.  Id. 
at 304 n.38.  Similarly, the disproportionately large bankruptcy filings among baby boomers is reflected in 
a shift in the average age of bankruptcy filers toward middle age, tracking their movement through their 
economic life cycle.  See Teresa A. Sullivan, Deborah Thorne, and Elizabeth Warren, Young, Old, and In 
Between: Who Files for Bankruptcy? 9 NORTON BANK. L. ADVISOR 1 (2001). 
113 SULLIVAN, ET AL., FRAGILE, supra note 88, at 39. 
114 See SULLIVAN, ET AL., FRAGILE, supra note 88, at 39-41. 
115 Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Baby Boomers and the Bankruptcy 
Boom, 4 NORTON’S BANKRUPTCY LAW ADVISOR 1 (April 1993). 
116 Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, Baby Boomers, supra note 115. 
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doubtful that this reflects unusual levels of economic stress, especially compared earlier 
generations such as the Great Depression.  This persistent record of unusually high 
bankruptcy filings is consistent with the impression that the Baby Boom generation has 
effected a dramatic change in social norms, for both good and bad, including traditional 
norms condemning bankruptcy. 
The unique baby boomer effect on changing social norms about bankruptcy is 
reflected in the difference in their filing rates as compared to subsequent generations as 
well.  Whereas baby boomers have filed bankruptcy at much higher rates than the rest of 
the population at large at every stage of their life-cycle, the early evidence is that the per 
capita filing rate among members of so-called “Generation X” has actually fallen from 
that of the baby boomers at the same stage of their life cycle.117  According to 
researchers, members of Generation X appear to be more financially and socially 
responsible and traditionalist than the Baby Boom generation, which may reverse or slow 
some of the baby boomer’s effects on changing social norms regarding bankruptcy.118  
On the other hand, although Generation X’s bankruptcy filing rate is lower than the 
boomers, is still remains high by historical standards, suggesting and that the baby 
boomers have left a permanent mark on the nation’s social norms regarding bankruptcy, 
and that generation change will not reverse underlying change in norms.119 
The intervention of bankruptcy attorneys may also play a role in eroding personal 
shame regarding bankruptcy.  In general, debtors’ attorneys seem to be somewhat more 
                                                 
117 Sullivan, Thorne, and Warren, supra note 112 (noting a 7.2% decrease in the rate at which debtors under 
the age of 25 file bankruptcy from boomers to Generation X). 
118 See Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, supra note 99, at 412; see also NEIL HOWE AND 
BILL STRAUSS, 13TH GEN: ABORT, RETRY, IGNORE, FAIL? 114-20 (1993); NEIL HOWE AND WILLIAM 
STRAUSS, MILLENNIALS RISING: THE NEXT GREAT GENERATION (2000); see also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, 
THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER (1999) (predicting 
return to traditional social norms following “great disruption” of recent decades). 
119 See Sullivan, Thorne, and Warren, supra note 112 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art21
 42
hostile toward creditors than are their clients and are especially dismissive of the belief 
that there is a moral, as opposed to purely legal, obligation to repay creditors.  Thus, 
Professor Braucher’s interview subjects express frustration regarding their clients’ belief 
that they have a moral obligation to repay the debts that they have incurred.  Much of the 
counseling that goes on between debtors’ attorneys and their clients seems to revolve 
around this desire to counsel the client out f his moral desire to repay his debts.  One 
lawyer observed, “[S]ome people feel there is a moral issue; frankly I don’t.”120  Another 
lawyer stated, “My attitude is – the law is there.  The credit card companies charge 20% 
interest.  Discharge is a risk of doing business.  I don’t feel bad about it.  Some debtors 
feel so harassed.  Some debtors say they feel bad about discharging debt, and I wonder if 
they do.  Some are overly emotional, and I’m thinking, ‘What’s the big deal?’  Especially 
with credit cards – it’s not like a friend or a relative.”121 
Many attorneys attack the moral and trust basis of the debtor-creditor relationship 
by contrasting this obligation with others that are generally regarded as having greater 
moral weight.  “A number of lawyers in the study,” Braucher reports, “said that they find 
themselves trying to talk debtors out of [the desire to repay their debts in] chapter 13.  
They use such tactics as raising the question of their clients’ moral obligations to their 
families, especially to their children, in order to diffuse clients’ sense of moral obligation 
to repay creditors.”122  When the moral obligation to pay creditors, especially distant 
                                                 
120 Braucher, Lawyers, supra note 23, at 523. 
121 Id. at 563. 
122 Id. at 509. 
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institutional creditors, is pitted against the moral obligations owed to one’s family, it is 
evident that the latter obligation will almost always prevail.123 
A change in social norms regarding bankruptcy also may be to some extent a 
consequence of the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.  A diminishment of the 
stigma associated with filing bankruptcy was implicit in the 1978 Code.  The Code 
expanded the nondiscrimination provision of section 525 to prohibit many forms of 
private discrimination against bankruptcy debtors and virtually all forms of public 
discrimination against debtors.124  The Code also purged the normatively-laden but 
ancient term “bankrupt” from the Code, substituting the more value-neutral term 
“debtor”125; similarly, a case filing is described generically as an “order for relief.”126  
The effect, if not the intent, of these semantic changes may have been in part to strip 
bankruptcy of moral and emotional baggage that had previously interfered with a straight 
financial calculation.  To the extent that legal rules have an “expressive” function in 
shaping social norms through law, it is possible that these semantic changes and the 
behaviors they regulate could also have an effect on reducing general attitudes of 
opprobrium toward bankruptcy filers.127 
The sheer number of filers alone has also probably tended to reduce the stigma 
associated with filing bankruptcy.  As more individuals file bankruptcy, more people 
know others who have filed bankruptcy.  The recognition that others have filed 
bankruptcy and have survived – indeed, in many cases prospered – makes bankruptcy 
                                                 
123 See Zywicki, Screwtape, supra note 19; see also Todd J. Zywicki, Evolutionary Psychology and Social 
Science, 13 HUMANE STUDIES REV. 1 (2000), available in http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/.  
124 11 U.S.C. §525. 
125 See Jones and Zywicki, supra note 3, at 219. 
126 Id. 
127 See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998). 
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more routine in society, reducing the stigma associated with it.  Thus, the sheer numbers 
of individuals who file bankruptcy contribute to the perception that bankruptcy is a 
common and routine process.128  As the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan observed 
in a famous article, society can only define so much of a given behavior as “deviant.”129  
Once a behavior becomes sufficiently widespread, at some point society redefines the 
behavior so as to relieve it of its “deviant” label, thereby implicitly tolerating previously 
inappropriate behavior.130  Thus, as bankruptcy becomes more common, especially 
among the middle class, it may lose some of its previous “deviant” social character and 
become more socially acceptable. 
The problem of enforcing traditional social norms may also be more difficult by 
the existence of celebrities and others who publicly flout those norms.  As noted, there 
have been several high-profile celebrity bankruptcies in recent years, which have 
arguably contributed to the sense that the bankruptcy stigma is eroding.  These celebrities 
may be unintentional “norms entrepreneurs” who subtly shift patterns of behavior in 
society.  Similar views are expressed by more pedestrian bankruptcy filers, a large 
                                                 
128 Thus, the argument regarding declining stigma and rising bankruptcy rates is not circular, as argued by 
some, see SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE, supra note 88, at 265, because this feedback loop takes place 
gradually and over time.  Social norms do not change immediately and all at once, and bankruptcy rates do 
not immediately jump to a higher equilibrium level.  Instead, there is a gradual unraveling over time, as 
higher filings and declining stigma create a feedback loop.  See COLEMAN, supra note 104. 
129 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 62 AMERICAN SCHOLAR 17, 19 (1993). 
130 One bankruptcy filer confessed in a CNN interview, “When I found out—this was watching it on the 
news, on the newspapers—that more and more people are doing it [filing bankruptcy], and . . . it’s not just a 
middle class you know, upper class too—rich people—everybody’s doing it.  And . . . I said: Why not me?  
You know, I’m just one more of theme.”  Your Money with John Metaxas (CNNfn television broadcast, 
Jan. 18, 1999).  In fact, whereas bankruptcy itself was once thought a deviant activity, today it is only 
bankruptcy fraud and abuse by rich filers that is thought of as deviant, and some bankruptcy scholars 
appear to have doubts about even this.  See, e.g., KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS (2000). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 45
number of which report that filing bankruptcy was fast, easy, and painless and that they 
would consider filing again if necessary.131 
This is not to say that changes in social norms regarding bankruptcy are automatic 
or immediate.  Filing bankruptcy and breaching the obligations of reciprocity strongly 
contradicts our inherent tendencies toward reciprocity and promise-keeping.132  To the 
extent that negative social norms and other incentives break down these innate 
cooperative tendencies, they generally do so only after long-lasting and intense 
pressure.133  It would be inaccurate today to say that society actively encourages filing 
bankruptcy.  But it seems accurate to characterize attitudes as drifting toward benign 
tolerance, thereby leading to increasing bankruptcies.  To the extent that this drift 
continues, it could create a vicious cycle, further undermining social norms and leading 
to still higher bankruptcy filings. 
 
IV. Changes in The Nature of Consumer Credit 
A final contributing factor to the rise in bankruptcy filing rates in recent years is a 
change in the nature of consumer credit and in consumer credit relations.  Consumer 
credit institutions have changed in a number of ways that at the margin would be 
expected to destabilize traditional debtor-creditor relationships and thereby increase 
bankruptcy filing rates.  Many of these changes have been inevitable—they are the 
unintended side-effect of technological and economic changes that have created more a 
economically efficient consumer credit system. From an economic perspective they are 
                                                 
131 See McKinley, supra note 61, at 38 (describing findings of a Visa survey that “66% of filers found the 
bankruptcy process to be an easy one” and that 27% of respondents would consider filing again). 
132 See Todd J. Zywicki, The Reciprocity Instinct (working paper). 
133 See Kevin McCabe, “Fiat Money as a Store of Value in an Experimental Market,” 12 J. ECON. 
BEHAVIOR AND ORG. 215 (1989). 
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beneficial and should be encouraged, even though a side-effect is that these same forces 
tend to undermine many of the traditional mechanisms for restraining opportunistic 
breach of credit contracts and have tended to exert upward pressure on bankruptcy filing 
rates.  So long as the overall benefits of more efficient credit markets exceed the costs of 
increased bankruptcies, this is a positive development.  The policy question is how to 
devise the set of institutions that maximizes the benefits of these financial innovations 
while minimizing the costs associated with them in terms of higher bankruptcies. 
A. The Shift to Credit Cards and Unsecured Consumer Credit 
A general shift toward greater use of unsecured credit, such as credit cards, has 
increased the frequency of bankruptcy.  Recent decades have seen a shift in consumer 
credit toward unsecured credit, primarily in the form of general purpose bank credit 
cards.  Unsecured credit, such as credit cards and medical bills, is generally dischargeable 
in bankruptcy absent some particular limitation imposed by bankruptcy law making 
certain unsecured debts nondischargeable.134  By contrast, the bankruptcy discharge is of 
little use to the debtor with respect to secured credit, such as home mortgages, home 
equity loans, security interests in personal property, layaway plans, or pawn shops.  
Bankruptcy discharge will also not help a debtor with informal credit arrangements such 
as loans from family members, historically the dominant source of most consumer 
credit.135  Holding everything else constant, therefore, as debtors make greater use of 
unsecured credit relative secured and informal credit, the value of the bankruptcy 
discharge will also increase.  As the value of the bankruptcy discharge increases, debtors 
will have a greater incentive to file bankruptcy. 
                                                 
134 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a). 
135 See CALDER, supra note 102. 
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Although credit cared use has risen dramatically during this period, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, there is little evidence that credit cards have increased overall 
consumer indebtedness, because the increase primarily has been a substitution of credit 
card debt for other types of consumer debt.  Although this may seem irrational at first 
glance given the seemingly “high” interest rates charged on credit cards, consider that for 
consumers the alternatives may include pawn shops, personal finance companies, retail 
store credit, and layaway plans, all of which are either more costly or otherwise less 
attractive than credit cards.136  Credit cards are also generally less expensive for lenders 
to issue, which is reflected in the overall price of credit cards relative to these other forms 
of credit.  The result, therefore, has not been to increase household indebtedness, but 
primarily to change the composition of debt within the household credit portfolio.137  The 
substitution has increased the use of “revolving” credit card debt, which a borrower can 
revolve from month to month, and decreased “installment” debt, such as car loans, credit 
from retailers (such as furniture stores), and loans from personal finance loans, where the 
debtor borrows a fixed amount of money and repays it in fixed installments over a fixed 
period of time. 
Figure 3 demonstrates that the increase in credit card debt is a substitute for a 
reduction in other traditional forms of consumer installment debt: 
                                                 
136 See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAPMAN L. REV. 79, 94-110 (2000).  
Presumably there has been a substitution for informal credit as well, such as family loans and pawn shops, 
but there is little data on the amount of informal borrowing in the economy. 
137 The reduction in transaction costs and availability of credit on more competitive terms would, of 
course, have an implicit wealth effect, shifting out consumer budget constraints and enabling marginally 
more borrowing.  But because they would also be wealthier, consumers could borrow more without 
increasing their effective debt burden, thus this increase in indebtedness would not be expected to have 
any greater correlation with bankruptcy.  In fact, the debt-service and debt-to-asset ratios have remained 
largely constant during recent years, further confirms the idea that the increase in new forms of credit are 
largely a substitute away from old forms of debt.  See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1. 
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Figure 3: Consumer Credit Oustanding as Percentage of 
Disposable Personal Income, 1959-2003
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Source: Federal Reserve Board and Bureau of Economic Analysis 
As Figure 3 indicates, the growth in revolving (credit card) debt over the past 
twenty-five years has clearly been a substitution from nonrevolving consumer debt to 
revolving debt, thus leaving overall consumer indebtedness (as a percentage of disposable 
income) largely unaffected.138  Revolving debt outstanding has risen during this period 
from zero to roughly 9% of outstanding debt.139  Nonrevolving installment debt, by 
                                                 
138 See also Thomas A. Durkin, Credit Cards: Use and Consumer Attitudes, 1970-2000, FED. RES. BULL. 
623, 623-24 (Sept. 2000) (noting that total consumer credit outstanding has risen in tandem with income 
growth); Thomas A. Durkin, in IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 44, at 35, 38, 39 Figure 2 (noting 
that ratio of consumer credit to income has remained relatively stable since 1956). 
139 In fact, this figure probably overstates the amount of revolving debt held by American households.  The 
majority of credit card users are convenience users who use credit cards as a transactional device and pay 
their balances in full each month, rather than revolving.  The percentage of convenience users relative to 
revolvers has risen steadily over time as credit cards have replaced cash as a transaction mechanism.  See 
Zywicki, Economics of Credit Cards, supra note 136, at 101; Ana M. Aizcorbe, Arthur B. Kennickell, & 
Kevin B. Moore, Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of 
Consumer Finances 25 FEDERAL RES. BULL. 1, 3 (Jan. 2003) (reporting that 55.3% of households pay their 
credit card bills in full each month).  Nonetheless, during that thirty-day cycle period convenience users are 
measured statistically as having outstanding credit balances that are added into the calculation of revolving 
debt.  As William Hampel observes, “[S]ome people have large balances every month, but also pay their 
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contrast, has fallen from its level of 19% of disposable income in the 1960s, to roughly 
12% today.  Thus, the increase in revolving debt has been almost exactly offset by a 
decrease in the installment debt burden.  In fact the recent bump in total indebtedness in 
recent years was not caused by an increase in revolving debt, which has remained largely 
constant for several years, but by an increase in installment debt, primarily as a result of a 
recent increase in car loans for the purchase of new automobiles.140  There is little 
indication that increased use of credit cards has precipitated greater financial stress 
among American households, because the increase in credit card usage has resulted 
primarily from a substitution of credit cards for other types of consumer credit, rather 
than an overall increase in indebtedness.141 
Unlike traditional forms of consumer credit, however, credit card and other 
unsecured debt is generally unsecured and dischargeable in bankruptcy.  Thus, holding 
total debt constant, substituting dischargeable unsecured debt for nondischargeable forms 
of debt will increase the propensity of a given individual to file bankruptcy.  This may 
explain the observed tendency of credit card defaults and defaults on other forms of 
unsecured consumer debt to track bankruptcy filing rates, whereas there seems to be no 
similar correlation between bankruptcy filings and defaults on home mortgage loans or 
                                                                                                                                                 
balances in full every month.  This exaggerates the size of revolving credit as a proportion of total credit 
and underestimates the amount of payments that takes place each month.”  See William Hempel, 
Discussion, in IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 44, at 66, 67.  See also id. (“Very simply, revolving 
credit . . . is not all debt.  I do not know of any data source that tells us how much of current revolving 
credit is merely transaction balances.”). 
140 See Aizcorbe, et al., supra note 139, at 24.  In particular, the growing popularity of sport utility vehicles, 
which are both more expensive and more valuable than traditional cars, thus they simultaneously increased 
indebtedness and increased household assets through their purchase.  Id. at 17. 
141 See Hempel, supra note 139, at 67 (“consumer credit has been fairly constant relative to income over the 
past 30 years, but the composition has changed”). 
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secured auto loans.142  For unsecured debts, the debtor can discharge the debts in question 
at little cost, whereas in the latter case the debtor will suffer the high cost of losing his 
house.  If bankruptcies were best explained as an involuntary response to adverse 
economic shocks, it would be expected that defaults on mortgage, automobile, and credit 
card debt, should be rising more or less in unison, because there would be no obvious 
reason why an individual would be “unable” to pay some debts but not others.  Given the 
different default rates on these various forms of credit, it is evident consumers are 
consciously choosing to pay some debts but not others—defaulting on their unsecured 
obligations, but paying their secured debts.  Thus, the general substitution by consumers 
in recent years toward unsecured debt, primarily as the result of greater use of credit 
cards, would tend to increase bankruptcy filing rates by increasing the percentage of debt 
that is dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
In addition, there is some evidence that bankruptcy filers tend to increase their 
credit card balances in the period leading up to bankruptcy.143  Credit card debt rises 
rapidly and is concentrated in the months immediately preceding bankruptcy suggests 
that credit card indebtedness does not cause bankruptcy in many cases, but that the debtor 
is already on the way toward bankruptcy when the credit card borrowing begins, and is 
either acting strategically as part of a credit card “bust out” or is simply drawing on credit 
cards as a line of credit of last resort.  Regardless, the effect is to dramatically increase 
                                                 
142 See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 249 (1997) (finding correlation between credit card defaults and bankruptcy filings); Thomas A. 
Durkin, in DURKIN AND STATEN, supra note 44, at 36, 38, and Figure 3 (finding no correlation with defaults 
on automobile loans and home mortgages). 
143 Gross & Souleles, supra note 57. 
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credit card use during a time when the debtor either knows he is going to file bankruptcy 
eventually or is likely to do so.144 
It also has been argued that credit cards have contributed to increased 
bankruptcies through a profligate expansion of credit card credit to high-risk borrowers, 
especially low-income borrowers.145  Although often-repeated, empirical studies have 
failed to support this theory.  As with consumers in general, the growth in credit card debt 
among low-income households has been primarily a substitution of credit cards for other 
for other types of credit, such as pawn shops and payday lenders, not an overall increase 
in indebtedness.  In fact, empirical researchers have failed to find evidence that rising 
consumer bankruptcies have been caused by extension of credit cards to less credit-
worthy borrowers, because the growth in credit card debt represents a substitution from 
other forms of credit, not an expansion of overall consumer indebtedness.146 
Thus, there is an observed correlation between credit card defaults and 
bankruptcy, but the available evidence fails to provide an economic risk-based 
explanation for the correlation.  This anomaly suggests that those who believe that the 
expansion of credit card use has contributed to rising bankruptcy filings may be correct—
but for the wrong reason.  Credit cards have not increased indebtedness and household 
                                                 
144 These credit card debts may be presumed nondischargeable under §523(a)(2)(C) as fraudulently 
induced, but only if they aggregate to over $1,150 within 60 days of bankruptcy for “luxury goods and 
services.”  Such limits are easily evaded, either by maxing out the card 61 days before bankruptcy, or 
charging discretionary but non-luxury items prior to bankruptcy that would not be considered “luxury” 
expenditures,, such as discretionary car or house repairs. 
145 See Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J. 1079, 1081 (1998); Susan L. DeJarnatt, Once 
is Note Enough: Preserving Consumers’ Rights to Bankruptcy Protection, 74 IND. L.J. 455, 499 (1999); 
Bernard R. Trujillo, The Wisconsin Exemption Clause Debate of 1846: An Historical Perspective on the 
Regulation of Debt, 1988 WISC. L. REV. 747, 749 (1998). 
146 See Donald P. Morgan & Ian Toll, Bad Debt Rising, CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON AND FIN. March 1997, at 
1, 4; Gross & Souleles, supra note 57; see also Zywicki, Bankruptcy Crisis, supra note 1 (discussing  
empirical evidence).  Consistent with the argument presented in the text here, Morgan and Toll conclude 
that increased consumer demand for credit cards, relative to other forms of consumer credit is driving the 
increase in credit card debt, not a supply-side shift by lenders.  Id. 
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financial distress, but instead have simply substituted impersonal unsecured credit for 
more localized secured credit.  On the other hand, because credit card debt is unsecured 
and dischargeable in bankruptcy, this substitution has increased the benefits of filing 
bankruptcy, notwithstanding the fact that credit cards have not increased overall 
consumer indebtedness. 
B. Greater Nationalization and Impersonalization of Consumer Credit 
This trend in consumer credit has also led to increased bankruptcy filings in a 
second way, by making consumer credit relations less “personal” in nature.  Although 
“greater impersonalization” of consumer credit is difficult to measure, there is a 
widespread perception that credit relations, especially for consumer credit, have become 
increasingly impersonalized in recent years as compared to the past.147  This change in 
credit relations has affected the willingness of individuals to file bankruptcy in three 
different ways: (1) by undermining the development of commercial trust relationships; 
(2) by undermining the constraints imposed by repeat dealings; and, (3) by reducing the 
constraints of individual credit reputation. 
Consumer credit was historically a highly personalized transaction, e.g., a corner 
grocery store or Main Street tailor selling goods to their customers on credit.148  Bank 
credit, for instance, required the debtor to withstand a personal and intrusive series of 
face-to-face interviews and probing inquiry into his social and business relationships to 
determine the debtor’s trustworthiness and reliability.  In fact, historically a major source 
of consumer credit was informal loans between family members.149  Traditional credit 
                                                 
147 Rafael Efrat, The Moral Appeal of Personal Bankruptcy, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 141, 161 (1998); see 
also Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 23, at 564. 
148 See CALDER, supra note 102. 
149 CALDER, supra note 102. 
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was of a highly personal and face-to-face nature, and the credit relationship is embedded 
within an ongoing economic and social relationship with the credit issuer.  Where the 
credit relationship is embedded in the context of a social and economic relationship, it is 
more likely that a trust relationship will arise between the parties.150 
Today, many consumer financial relations are conducted with large interstate 
banks and South Dakota and Delaware-based credit card issuers such as Citibank and 
MBNA.  Impersonal credit relations, such as dealing with these institutional lenders, are 
less likely to evolve into high-trust relations, and these weaker extralegal constraints 
make individuals more willing to breach those promises.151  In part, this is because 
individuals do not tend to form trust relationships with artificial entities, such as 
corporations, in the same way that they do with other human beings.  These economic 
exchange relations lack the embedded personal and extended economic relations that 
characterize older and more local forms of credit.  Thus, an individual is less likely to feel 
himself bound in a trust relationship with his credit card issuer than he would be if he 
purchased a suit on store credit from his local tailor.152  Indeed, as David Skeel observes, 
part of the impetus for the 1898 Bankruptcy Act was the concern of merchants who 
engaged in interstate commerce that when debtors ran into financial trouble they “played 
favorites” with their creditors, preferring “family members and local creditors, not the 
                                                 
150 Efrat, supra note 147, at 159. 
151 Efrat, supra note 147, at 159. 
152 As Efrat observes: “[A] consumer debtor is less likely to develop a trust relationship beyond the 
deterrence-based level with a large credit card company.  The consumer debtor is not likely to have any 
face-to-face contact with the institutional creditor.  The parties infrequently communicate, and when they 
do, they mainly use impersonal channels such as a telephone.  Furthermore, a courtship will not likely 
develop between the parties.  The parties are not likely to watch each other act in social situations or 
observe each other in [a] variety of emotional states.  Therefore, the lack of personal bonding precludes 
most of these types of relationships from developing into a knowledge-based credit trust relationship.”  
Efrat, supra note 147, at 159.  This same analysis could apply to the development of trust relationships by 
creditors, but the primary constraint on lender opportunism are contracts and other more formal 
institutions, including legislation and regulation, as well as repeat-dealing and reputation effects, thus trust 
seems much less relevant on the lender’s side of the transaction. 
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out-of-state merchants.”153  Lower-trust relationships, therefore, are more prone to 
opportunism than in high-trust transaction contexts. 
Individuals psychologically evaluate transactions differently depending on 
whether they are of a personalized or an impersonalized nature.  The closer is the social 
connection between the trading partners, the greater is the likelihood that the individuals 
will trust one another.154  The longer the parties have known each other, and the more 
integrated their social network and the number of mutual friends they have in common, 
the more likely they are to trust one another.155  Individuals also appear to be more likely 
to recognize the positive-sum nature of personal relations marked by an ongoing 
reciprocity of mutual advantage and to vest these “win-win” relationships with positive 
moral weight.156  By contrast, individuals tend see impersonal relationships as zero-sum 
in nature, removing a psychological constraint on acting opportunistically.157 
The growth of credit cards illustrates the trend toward more national and 
impersonal credit.  Prior to the widespread development and use of credit cards, the 
American consumer economy was highly localized.  Even if one was merely traveling, it 
could be very difficult to get credit if necessary.  In the past, individuals had to make use 
of more indirect and costly means for proving their creditworthiness to strangers.  For 
instance, when Max Weber visited the United States in 1904, he witnessed an adult 
baptism by immersion.158  When he inquired as to why the individual sought baptism he 
was informed that it was so that he could open a bank.  Because Baptist congregations 
                                                 
153 SKEEL, supra note 17, at 36. 
154 See Edward L. Glaeser, et al. Measuring Trust, 115 Q. J. ECON. 811, 834 (2000). 
155 Id. 
156 See Vernon L. Smith, Reflections on Human Action After 50 Years, 19 CATO J. 195, 207 (1999). 
157 Id. 
158 See Jeremy Shearmur and Daniel B. Klein, Good Conduct in the Great Society: Adam Smith and the 
Role of Reputation, in REPUTATION 29 (1997) (describing Weber’s report). 
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conducted in-depth character evaluations of individuals before admitting them as 
members, “Admission to the congregation [was] recognized as an absolute guarantee of 
the moral qualities of a gentleman, especially of those qualities required in business 
matters.”159  Thus, “When a sect member moved to a different place, or if he was a 
traveling salesman, he carried the certificate of his congregation with him; and thereby 
found not only easy contact with sect members but, above all, he found credit 
everywhere.”   
These informal means of establishing credit have been supplanted by credit cards 
a universal medium of credit.  “The sects’ inquiries into the would-be member’s probity 
are paralleled by the credit card company’s scrutiny of the would-be cardholders’ credit 
record.”160  Today, “In a large and anonymous society such as the United States, many 
people carry credit cards, which speak for them to people with whom they have had no 
previous contact and with whom they may well never be in contact again.”161 
This trend towards more impersonalized credit has increased the efficiency of 
American consumer credit markets and expanded consumer choice in credit.  Prior to the 
nationalization of credit markets, rural consumers suffered from the lack of competition 
among banks as issuers of credit.162  Small-town debtors had limited ability to shop 
around to get competing offers of credit.  Thus, while a debtor might personally know the 
loan officer at the bank, in many instances this personalized relationship came at the cost 
                                                 
159 MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT SECTS AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM, quoted in Shearmur and Klein, 
supra note 158, at 36. 
160 Shearmur and Klein, supra note 158, at 41-42. 
161 Shearmur and Klein, supra note 158, at 41. 
162 See Zywicki, Economics of Credit Cards, supra note 136 (discussing effect of lack of competition on 
bank lending terms). 
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of reduced competition and customer choice.163  On the other hand, the personalized 
nature of these traditional lending relationships could give rise to subtle bias and even 
discrimination.  Reliance on impersonalized systems such as credit-scoring and the like 
has substantially reduced racial and other improper bias from the lending decision, 
thereby leading to an expansion of credit to traditionally underserved individuals.164  
Finally, the nationalization of credit has generated competition on a massive scale.  For 
instance, there are currently over 6,000 issuers of credit cards, and barriers to entry are 
low.  This has led to robust static and dynamic competition in the credit card market, 
driving economic efficiency and pro-consumer innovation.165 
The greater impersonalization of consumer credit has had dramatic consequences 
in expanding customer choice and liberating customers from the constraints of traditional 
credit choices.  But this increasing impersonalization of lending also tends to undermine 
the moral obligation that borrowers feel toward lenders, thereby increasing the likelihood 
that the debtor would engage in post-contractual opportunism and to avoid repaying these 
debts.  For instance, as noted earlier, in order to reduce debtor guilt regarding bankruptcy, 
lawyers distinguish between personal moral obligations owed to family and friends, 
versus financial obligations owed to credit card lenders and other abstract institutions.166  
Such a distinction between debts owed to friends versus institutional lenders would not 
have been as tenable in the past, when most credit was local in nature and often bundled 
with retail transactions from a lender who was also a local merchant and neighbor.  This 
                                                 
163 Consider in this context the dramatic difference between the availability of 24-hour customer service 
for credit card operations versus the lasting practice of “banker’s hours” for traditional deposit banks. 
164 See INFORMATION POLICY INSTITUTE, THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT: ACCESS, EFFICIENCY, & 
OPPORTUNITY (2003). 
165 See Zywicki, Economics of Credit Cards, supra note 136, at 128-45. 
166 See supra notes 120-122. 
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decline of a trust relationship between lenders and borrowers may help to explain the 
increasing willingness to discharge these contractual obligations though bankruptcy. 
In addition to leading to a decrease in personal shame, there has also been a 
reduction in the constraint imposed by repeat dealing.  Repeat dealing constrains 
opportunistic behavior by holding out the prospect that the long-term benefit from the 
maintenance of the continue relationship exceeds the gain that an individual could make 
by acting opportunistically.167  Consumer borrowers historically had limited credit 
options, primarily because of geographic limitations on the number of credit issuers with 
whom the debtor could reasonably interact.  Traditionally, retail goods and credit were 
tied together, such that a borrower who failed to pay his credit bills would be unable to 
purchase goods on credit in the future.168  It was also relatively more expensive for 
debtors in prior eras to relocate to a new community to start over after filing bankruptcy.  
Given this small number of credit issuers, the debtor dared not to default, as it would be 
exceedingly difficult to obtain credit in the future.  The fact that the debtor was locked 
into repeat-dealing relationships with a relatively small number of credit issuers with 
whom he would have to deal in the future placed constraints on the willingness of the 
debtor to breach his promises. 
                                                 
167 See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); Lester G. Telser, A Theory of 
Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27 (1980). 
168 A similar system, albeit in a non-consumer context is described by Karen Clay in her analysis of trade 
and credit in Mexican California in the 1840s.  See Karen Clay, Trade Without Law: Private-Order 
Institutions in Mexican California, 13 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 202 (1997); Karen Clay, Trade, Institutions, and 
Credit, 34 EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 495, 505 (1997).  The uncoupling of the credit 
transaction from the retail transaction may also have other unanticipated psychological consequences.  
When the debtor receives both goods and credit from the same seller, there may be an obvious transactional 
connection that is absent where the credit transaction is separated from the goods.  The uncoupling of the 
credit transaction from the goods that were purchased may weaken the borrower’s sense of reciprocal 
obligation by eliminating the obvious and direct causal nexus between the credit bill and what it purchased.  
I have seen no evidence on this point, although it is a plausible hypothesis.  I would like to thank Professor 
Owen Jones for suggesting this observation. 
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Today, by contrast, the multitude of options available to a former bankrupt 
removes much of this constraint imposed by repeat dealing.  Although bankruptcy filers 
will face some restriction on the number of creditors who will lend to them and may have 
to pay somewhat higher credit terms, post-bankruptcy debtors will find a relatively 
vibrant and competitive market for lending.169  Thus, a bankruptcy filer is not required to 
go back to the same lenders with whom she previously dealt.  This attenuates the 
constraint of repeat-dealing relationships, thereby increasing the debtor’s willingness to 
file bankruptcy at the margin. 
For similar reasons, these developments have attenuated the constraining effects 
of reputation.170  Maintaining a reputation-based system of contract enforcement also 
requires the maintenance of a system of ostracism, both for the “defector,” but also for 
any member who enters into later dealings with the defector.171  This willingness to 
punish a defector even at some cost to oneself (or to forego the benefits of trading with 
her) creates a public goods problem, which can lead to free riding by others who are 
benefited but do not have to bear the cost themselves.172  The willingness to punish 
someone who fails to punish the initial party creates a second-order public goods 
problem.  Such punishment raises substantial collective action problems, as it becomes 
necessary not only to monitor misbehavior by the original party, but it is also necessary to 
monitor the behavior of all the other members of the group to ensure that they are not 
                                                 
169 See discussion supra at notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
170 Reputation in this context can be distinguished from repeat-dealing in that the discipline of repeat-
dealing turns on the bilateral exchange between a specific borrower and lender, whereas reputation includes 
monitoring and punishment by third-party lenders.  For purposes of this article, sanctioning behavior by 
other consumers is labeled as “social norms” or “social stigma” to distinguish it from the commercial 
reputation effects of third-party lenders. 
171 I use the term “defector” here in the descriptive manner used in the game theory literature to refer to a 
non-cooperator, here the bankruptcy filer. 
172 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §8.5 (6th ed. 2003) 
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reneging on their independent promise to ostracize those who cheat one member of the 
group.  As the size of the group increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to overcome 
these collective action problems and to detect and punish those who fail to punish the 
original defector. 
This collective action problem explains, in part, the relative ease with which 
bankruptcy filers today can find access to credit following bankruptcy as compared to 
prior eras.  Staten found, for instance, that bankruptcy filers who reacquired credit were 
much more likely to obtain credit from a new lender rather than a pre-bankruptcy 
lender.173  Whereas lenders may prefer as a group to ostracize borrowers who file 
bankruptcy, in practice each lender has an individual incentive to lend to a debtor who 
files bankruptcy.  Ironically, a debtor who files bankruptcy and receives a discharge may 
be a relatively better credit risk than prior to filing bankruptcy, because she cannot 
receive another discharge for six years.174  The expansion of home equity lending further 
reinforces this, because many lenders will lend on collateral even if they would not 
extend unsecured credit.  Thus, each lender individually has a private incentive to deal 
with a bankrupt at the right price, notwithstanding the fact that lenders as a group might 
prefer to “blackball” all bankruptcy filers.175 
 
V. What To Do About Rising Bankruptcies? 
                                                 
173 Staten, Impact, supra note 81, at 12.  Nor did it make a difference whether a debtor discharged his debts 
in chapter 7 or filed chapter 13 and presumably attempted to repay some of his prepetition debts.  Id. at 16. 
174 See 11 U.S.C.§727(a)(8). 
175 This second-order punishment problem becomes more acute where the existing group cannot restrain 
entry by new lenders who can enter the market to serve those subject to ostracism at the hands of the 
incumbents.  See POSNER, supra note 172, at §8.5, p. 262.  Barriers to entry are low in consumer credit 
markets, especially with the invention of non-bank finance companies, and in recent years, the greatest 
amount of entry appears to have occurred in the subprime market, which specializes in lending to 
consumers with previous bankruptcies and tarnished credit.  See Zywicki, Economics of Credit Cards, 
supra note 136, at 130-38. 
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This article has proposed a new model of consumer bankruptcy rooted in the New 
Institutional Economics.  It is argued that the upward trend line in consumer bankruptcy 
filing rates over the past two decades has resulted from a confluence of three general 
factors: (1) a change in the relative costs and benefits of filing bankruptcy; (2) a change 
in the social norms traditionally associated with filing bankruptcy; and (3) changes in the 
consumer credit market that have eroded the informal institutions of trust, repeat dealing, 
and commercial reputation.  Available empirical evidence tends to support the model, but 
further testing will be necessary before reaching a final conclusion.  Assuming that the 
New Institutional Economics model of bankruptcy advanced here is correct, what, if 
anything, does this say about appropriate reforms to the consumer bankruptcy system? 
By synthesizing academic research and turning it into applied legislative reform, 
the traditional model of consumer bankruptcy provided the intellectual foundation for the 
1978 Code.176  Similarly, the NIE model of consumer bankruptcy described in this article 
provides a conceptual foundation for many of the legislative reforms included in the 
bankruptcy reform legislation. 
This Part briefly reviews possible policy implications of the model described 
here.177  In particular, three lines of policy reforms are examined.  First, proposed 
amendments in the bankruptcy reform legislation that would reorient the relative costs 
and benefits associated with filing bankruptcy.  Second, policy initiatives designed to 
reverse or compensate for the change in social norms that has reduced bankruptcy’s 
stigma.  Finally, I will briefly explore the implications of the model here regarding 
fundamental reforms proposed by some scholars, such as eliminating the mandatory 
                                                 
176 See SKEEL, supra note 17. 
177 I have addressed these policy arguments in more detail elsewhere, and just provide a brief overview 
here.  See Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Reform: An Economic Analysis (working paper). 
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fresh-start provision of current law and instead reformulating the fresh start as a default 
rule that can be waived by the debtor. 
A. Adjust the Relative Costs and Benefits of Filing Bankruptcy 
The first and most direct policy response to rising bankruptcy filings would be to 
rebalance the benefits and costs associated with filing bankruptcy.  Increasing the costs 
associated with filing bankruptcy, however, would not be appropriate, in that increasing 
the deadweight cost of learning about and filing bankruptcy would advance no valuable 
policy goal.178  The goal of the bankruptcy system should be to deliver relief to those who 
are thought to deserve it, while limiting its use by others.  Increasing the transaction costs 
of filing bankruptcy surely would reduce bankruptcy filings, but this would advance no 
coherent policy goal.179  Thus, the focus should be on decreasing the benefits associated 
with bankruptcy, especially to high-income and high-wealth debtors who could repay a 
substantial portion of their debts in bankruptcy but choose not to. 
Several of the provisions in the bankruptcy reform legislation are designed to 
reduce some of the benefits associated with filing bankruptcy.  To reduce the 
attractiveness of bankruptcy for high-income debtors, the bankruptcy reform legislation 
proposes to “means-test” eligibility of bankruptcy filers for Chapter 7 relief.180  Under 
means-testing, a debtor would be required to have to file in Chapter 13 rather than 
                                                 
178 Unless, of course, the increased costs were just a by-product of reforms for which the benefits exceeded 
the costs.  For instance, proposals to reduce fraud and abuse could have small costs associated with them, 
but have substantial offsetting benefits. 
179 For instance, we could have a rule of randomly dismissing every tenth bankruptcy filing, which would 
reduce filings, but would accomplish no coherent policy goal. 
180 Bankruptcy Reform Act §102.  A detailed examination of the means-testing provisions of the 
bankruptcy reform legislation is provided in Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3, at 181-208, on which this 
Section draws.  The relevant provision appears as §102 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act.  See also REPORT 
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 333, 
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2001 2 (Feb. 26, 2001) (“The 
heart of H.R. 333’s consumer bankruptcy reforms is the implementation of an income/expense screening 
mechanism (‘needs-based bankruptcy relief’) to ensure that debtors repay creditors the maximum they can 
afford.”). 
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Chapter 7, if she: (1) earns above the state median income, (2) could repay a substantial 
portion of her debts out of “disposable income” in Chapter 13 after subtracting out a slate 
of allowed expenses, and (3) does not have significant special circumstances that offset 
the presumption of a chapter 13 filing.  As a substantive matter, means-testing simply 
institutionalizes the “substantial abuse” inquiry of section 707(b), but invigorates 
enforcement of that moribund provision by shifting the burden of persuasion in cases 
where the concern about abuse is highest.181  A debtor who is means-tested into Chapter 
13 thus would not be denied a discharge on account of triggering the means-testing 
provisions of the code; she would simply have her discharge conditioned on completing a 
court approved Chapter 13 plan and paying off what she can to unsecured creditors. 
It is estimated that approximately 7-10% of bankruptcy filers would satisfy all 
elements of the means-test under the proposed legislation and be required to file in 
Chapter 13.182  Because the means-test targets those with the highest repayment capacity, 
this would result in a substantial repayment of debt currently discharged in bankruptcy.183  
Under current law, by contrast, because of exemptions and pre-bankruptcy planning, 
there is no distribution at all to general unsecured creditors in 96% of Chapter 7 cases, 
and only a trivial distribution in other cases.184  Recovering some of this discharged debt 
through means-testing would reduce bankruptcy losses and, therefore, the cost to lenders.  
In turn, some of these savings would be passed onto consumers in terms of lower interest 
                                                 
181 Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3, at 181-208. 
182 See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3, at 181-208. 
183 One estimate concluded that means-tested debtors could repay 64% of their unsecured nonpriority debts, 
or over $4 billion, in addition to all of their priority and secured debts.  See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3, 
at 187. 
184 See Michael J. Herbert & Domenic E. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia: The Distribution of 
Assets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed in 1984-1987, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 303, 315-16 
(1988); see also Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Economic 
Analysis, 63 IND. L. J. 1, 38-39 (1987-88) (estimating average repayment rate of one to two percent in 
Chapter 7 cases). 
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rates, lower credit costs generally, and greater benefits to consumers.  Because little is 
known about the exact elasticity of supply and demand for consumer credit, it is not clear 
how much of this savings would be passed on to consumers in the form of lower credit 
costs and increased benefits, as opposed to increasing creditor’s return on assets.185 
 In addition, Congress could amend the Code to reduce the benefits of bankruptcy 
to high-wealth debtors.186  The incentives of high-wealth debtors to file bankruptcy 
results primarily from property exemptions and exceptions of certain property from the 
bankruptcy estate, such as ERISA-qualified pension plans.187  Given the increasing 
ability of debtors to act strategically to transfer assets to these exempt and excepted  
sources as part of pre-bankruptcy planning activities, it may be appropriate to give new 
statutory and equitable tools to judges to try to reduce these benefits by limiting the 
amount of property that bankruptcy filers can protect through bankruptcy exemptions. 
The notorious unlimited homestead exemption available in a handful of states has 
come in for special criticism in this context, especially in the popular press.188  Other 
exemptions under state law are potentially subject to abuse as well, but in practice courts 
have been more deferential to protecting large amounts of wealth in homestead 
exemptions than in other forms of unlimited or high-value exemptions.189  Even less 
common is the concern that bankruptcy debtors will relocate on the eve of bankruptcy in 
                                                 
185 See Kartik B. Athreya, Welfare Implications of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, 49 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 1567, 1583 (2002) (estimating that means-testing would reduce credit costs to households by 
approximately $80 per year). 
186 In addition, Congress could improve safeguards against outright fraud, such as concealing assets.   The 
FBI estimates that roughly 10% of bankruptcy filings have some sort of fraud, usually asset concealment.  
See http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/fc/ec/bf/bf.htm.  Although greater safeguards would reduce the benefits of 
filing bankruptcy for fraudulent filers, it is sufficiently obvious, that it is not discussed in the text.  
Nonetheless, many of the provisions in the bankruptcy reform legislation accomplish this purpose. 
187 See 11 U.S.C. §510(c); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992). 
188 For a comprehensive analysis of the empirical and political debates regarding homestead exemptions, 
see G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L. J. 227 
(2000). 
189 See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, STEVE H. NICKLES, AND JAMES J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY §8-32, p. 650 (1993). 
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order to take advantage of other states’ unlimited homestead exemption.190  Nonetheless, 
the homestead exemption is symbolically important, and even though the tangible 
benefits of greater limits on homestead are relatively small in light of the relatively small 
number of affected filers, the marginal costs of reform are small as well.191  Reducing the 
amount of wealth that can be protected in a Chapter 7 filing by reducing bankruptcy 
exemptions would also tend to cause a substitution by filers from Chapter 7 to Chapter 
13, which might increase returns to creditors and reduce some of the benefits of filing 
bankruptcy.192  There is also a high correlation between income and wealth, thus means-
testing high-income debtors into Chapter 13 will reduce some of the benefits of 
bankruptcy even to those who retain large homestead exemptions. 
A potentially larger problem arises from the interaction of rising housing values 
during recent decades, the operation of the homestead exemption, and the blossoming of 
home equity lending markets.  By increasing accumulated home equity, increases in 
home values also increase the effective value of the homestead exemption to potential 
filers.  Through pre-bankruptcy planning, a debtor can strategically increase her home 
equity by paying down her home mortgage at the expense of her unsecured creditors and 
then discharge her unsecured debt in bankruptcy.  Following bankruptcy, the debtor will 
likely be able to gain credit on a home equity loan, secured by the equity that was 
accumulated prior to filing bankruptcy.  Because the loan is secured rather than 
unsecured, a typical middle-class debtor with substantial accumulated home equity will 
                                                 
190 See  Ronel Elul and Narayanan Subramaniam, Forum-Shopping and Personal Bankruptcy, Working 
Paper 99-1, Department of Economics, Brown University (1999) (finding that a small number of 
individuals relocate from low-exemption to high-exemption states for purposes of filing bankruptcy); 
Vukowich, supra note 15 
191 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
192 See Ian Domowitz & Robert L. Sartain, Determinants of the Consumer Bankruptcy Decision, 54 J. FIN. 
403, 404 (1999). 
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likely be able to obtain a home equity loan on competitive terms.  As a result, a 
sophisticated debtor can essentially “launder” prepetition money to himself postpetition, 
by combining the homestead exemption with a post-bankruptcy home equity loan.193 
The proposed bankruptcy reform legislation would eliminate several of the most 
egregious forms of abuse.  First, any debtor who moved from a state with a limited 
exemption to a state with an unlimited exemption would face a 2 year waiting period 
before she could avail herself of the new state’s homestead exemption.194  This waiting 
period eliminates the opportunity for a debtor to relocate on the eve of bankruptcy in 
order to gain the benefits of a more generous homestead exemption.  Notably, this would 
prevent individuals such as O.J. Simpson, from relocating to a new state such as Florida 
in order to take advantage of Florida’s unlimited homestead exemption.195  Second, 
provisions in the reform act also would allow victims of securities and other financial 
fraud potentially to reach the homestead assets of individuals such as Scott Sullivan, the 
former WorldCom executive who owns a $15 million homestead outside Boca Raton, 
Florida.196  Third, the legislation would permit a ten year statute of limitations for claims 
that a debtor had fraudulently manipulated her homestead exemption as a fraudulent 
transfer.197  The legislation does not impose a flat cap on the amount of equity a debtor 
can protect in his homestead exemption, a decision that arguably is justified by 
                                                 
193 See Todd J. Zywicki, Rewrite the Bankruptcy Code, Not the Scriptures: Protecting a Debtor’s Right to 
Tithe in Bankruptcy, 1998 WISC. L. REV. 1223 (1998). 
194 Bankruptcy Reform Act § 307. 
195 See Stephen Frater, Home $weet Home, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE 12 (May 31, 2004), available in 
2004 WL 80356131. 
196 Bankruptcy Reform Act § 322 (capping value of homestead exemption against claims of fraud, 
securities fraud, and other intentional harms at $125,000 if acquired within 1215 days of bankruptcy).  It is 
not clear when exactly Sullivan acquired his Florida homestead.  Frater reports the value as $15 million, 
which served as collateral on Sullivan’s $10 million bail bond for his criminal securities fraud prosecution. 
197 Bankruptcy Reform Act §308. 
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federalism concerns.198  By preventing forum-shopping and fraudulent use of the 
homestead exemption, the legislation eliminates the most glaring abuses of current law. 
As noted above, there also appears to be a rising number of cases where debtors 
file bankruptcy despite possessing substantial retirement savings.199  The caselaw results 
are mixed on the willingness of judges to police this behavior and to dismiss these filings.  
Certainly, judges could be more consistenly vigilant in reviewing and dismissing cases 
where debtors possess very substantial exempt retirement savings.  Unfortunately, the 
bankruptcy reform legislation would actually move the law in the opposite direction, by 
creating greater protections for retirement savings.200  Ideally, this safe harbor should be 
struck from the legislation, although it was added some time ago in response to an earlier 
proposal to codify greater restrictions on the exemption of retirement savings. 
More fundamentally, by reducing abuse and by reducing the public perception of 
widespread abuse of the system, bankruptcy reform will tend to increase support for the 
bankruptcy system as a whole.201  By reserving bankruptcy relief for those who need it 
and preventing abuse by those who do not, the reform measures discussed will increase 
public confidence that the system is operating properly to forgive those who need it.  
Measured reforms to reduce abuse, therefore, may help to head-off more sweeping 
changes later that would attack opportunistic and legitimate bankruptcy filers equally. 
                                                 
198 It can be argued that this decision is defensible in that it appears that most of the cost associated with 
generous state exemption policies are borne by other consumers within the state, in terms of less access to 
credit, lower loan approval rates, and higher interest rates, than for residents of states with lower exemption 
rates.  See Gropp et al., supra note 41.  Both the benefits and costs of a state’s homestead exemption policy 
remain mainly within the state and do not spillover onto residents of other jurisdictions, thus this policy 
choice arguably is protected by federalism principles.  Thus, the two year waiting period imposed by the 
legislation permits creditors to adjust to the higher risk of a debtor’s move to a more generous state. 
199 See supra notes 50-55. 
200 Bankruptcy Reform Legislation §224. 
201 Cf. Posner, Tax Compliance, supra note 89 (noting that transparent tax shelters and other obvious 
abuses of the tax system undermine faith in the fairness and integrity of the tax system and thereby reduce 
voluntary compliance). 
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2. Reversing the Change in Social Norms 
Societal patterns of cooperation or noncooperation usually develop over long 
periods of time and can be very difficult to change.  “Trust and distrust feed upon each 
other,” Matt Ridley observes.202  “Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms, and 
networks, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative.  Virtuous circles result in social 
equilibria with high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement, and 
collective well-being.  These traits define the civic community,” writes Robert Putnam.  
“Conversely,” he continues, “the absence of these traits in the uncivic community is also 
self-reinforcing.  Defection, distrust, shirking, exploitation, isolation, disorder, and 
stagnation intensify one another in a suffocating miasma of vicious circles.”203  Thus, 
undermining habits of reciprocity in commercial exchange will tend to erode the values 
of reciprocity and trust in social, economic, and political relations.204 
The vicious-cycle characteristic of the negative changes in social norms as well as 
the diffuse nature of evolution of norms makes it difficult to identify particular policy 
proposals that could reverse the deterioration of social norms regarding bankruptcy.205  
Few theorists have provided persuasive prescriptions as to how to build social trust or to 
reverse a decline in social trust.206  In fact, there may be little that law can do to reverse 
these sorts of large social movements.  According to the “expressive” theory of law, 
however, legal rules can shape social norms at the margin.  The bankruptcy reform 
legislation contains several provisions that would be consistent with a goal of reinstating 
                                                 
202 RIDLEY, ORIGINS OF VIRTUE, supra note 97, at 250. 
203 ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 177 (1993). 
204 Frank Buckley refers to this effect as creating “distrust externalities.”  F. H. Buckley, The Debtor as 
Victim, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1086 (2002). 
205 I assume for purposes of this discussion the desirability of reinstating traditional social norms regarding 
bankruptcy and leave aside normative arguments about the desirability of this policy goal. 
206 See Stephen Knack and Paul J. Zak, Building Trust: Public Policy, Interpersonal Trust, and Economic 
Development, 10 S. CT. ECON. REV. 91 (2003) (identifying public policies that can build social trust). 
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some of the traditional social norms regarding bankruptcy.  For instance, it requires a 
debtor to seek mandatory consumer credit counseling in order to try to work out a 
voluntary repayment plan with creditors before she can file for bankruptcy which will 
tend to reinforce the value of voluntary repayment.207  The means-testing provisions, 
which require high-income debtors who can repay a substantial portion of their debts 
without significant hardship to do so, would send a powerful social message regarding 
the importance of living up to financial obligations to the best of one’s ability.208  
Although not part of the current reform proposals, it also may be worthwhile to 
reconsider the decision of the 1978 Code to de-stigmatize bankruptcy and to de-
emphasize the moral qualities of bankruptcy by resuscitating the traditional term 
“bankrupt” and reconsidering the broad prohibition against discrimination against 
bankruptcy filers currently found in the Code.209 
In addition to trying to reverse the atrophy of social norms, it may also be 
efficient to simply acknowledge this fact, and propose amendments to formal legal 
institutions that correct for these changes.  Much of the decline in social norms regarding 
bankruptcy is an inevitable outgrowth of the increasing complexity and mobility of 
modern society.  Trying to reverse these trends in social norms, therefore, may not be 
                                                 
207 See Bankruptcy Reform Act §106.  This provision has been part of all of the various iterations of the 
bankruptcy reform legislation over the past several years and has been widely supported, even by critics of 
bankruptcy reform generally.  See SKEEL, supra note 17, at 207-08 (“From the earliest days of the [reform] 
debate, the bankruptcy legislation included provisions requiring every debtor to submit to credit counseling 
before filing for bankruptcy, and again after the conclusion of the bankruptcy case.”); id. at 207-08 
(describing comments of Professor Karen Gross and lawyer Henry Sommer).  On the other hand, some 
have criticized this requirement as unnecessarily increasing the cost and complexity of seeking bankruptcy 
relief.  See id.  See also David Wessel, The Muddled Course of Bankruptcy Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 
2001, at p. A1, available in 2001 WL-WSJ 2855047 (quoting Professor David Skeel). 
208 See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3, at 207. 
209 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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practical.  Instead, it may be more promising to update formal institutions to serve as 
“trust substitutes” that can take the place of weakening social norms. 
There is an interaction between formal and informal institutions.210  Formal 
institutions can be either a complement to or substitute for informal institutions.211  For 
instance, informal measures such as reputation, repeat-dealing, and interpersonal trust can 
be a substitute for formal rules of contract enforcement.212  Stuart Macaulay’s classic 
study of commercial relations in business and the minimal reliance placed on written 
contracts illustrates the point.213  Similarly, the traditional reluctance of the common law 
to intervene in contracts made among family members reflects the implicit judgment that 
formal legal enforcement of these promises adds little to their efficient level of 
enforcement beyond informal extralegal enforcement of family ties.214  On the other 
hand, where informal institutions are weak, legal enforcement of promises can increase 
their reliability, providing greater opportunities for efficient reliance.  As philosopher 
Robert Goodin states the point, “Through the institutions of contract law, private 
promises are publicly enforced.  Public sanctions can in that way substitute for private 
                                                 
210 Some economists have remarked on the interaction between formal institutions and informal norms and 
practices in policing opportunism in the context of corporate bankruptcy.  See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, 
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 122 (1985) (noting that in Japan “[t]he hazards of trading 
are less severe . . . because of cultural and institutional checks on opportunism”); Marc Ramseyer, 
Sanctions without Law: The Japanese Financial Clearinghouse Guillotine and Its Impact on Default 
Rates, in Klein, REPUTATION, supra note 158 at 225.  On the other hand, there has been little discussion of 
the interaction between formal and informal institutions in the context of consumer bankruptcy. 
211 See Larry Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553 (2001). 
212 See POSNER, supra note 172, at §4.1. 
213 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Survey, 28 AM 
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 55 (1963). 
214 See Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 
89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980). 
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honor, and trust in the public institutions might therefore substitute for trust in private 
individuals.”215 
Increasing complexity of economic exchange tends to drive the institutions 
governing exchange to greater reliance on more formal and abstract institutions.216  As 
Anthropologist Sally Merry has observed, “With increasing social complexity, informal 
social controls diminish in significance and are replaced by formal mechanisms of social 
control.”217  The development of credit bureaus in the United States illustrates this 
evolution of more formal institutions as trust substitutes as commercial exchange 
becomes more complex.218  Credit records were initially proprietary, consisting of one 
merchant’s records about borrower’s accounts.  These proprietary records, however, did 
little to constrain opportunism, as borrowers could simply jump from one credit to 
another, taking advantage of each in turn.  Merchants and lenders eventually came to 
“pool” their information, formally and informally, allowing a more complete report on 
each potential borrower and a more robust system of reporting on reputation.  Through 
this process, the first credit bureaus were born.  They were local in scope originally, 
                                                 
215 Robert E. Goodin, Trusting Individuals Versus Trusting Institutions: Generalizing the Case of Contract, 
12 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 381, 382 (2000). 
216 See NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 11; see also Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the 
Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 
(2001) (noting increased reliance on formal institutions in response to decline in “Old South” norms of 
Memphis cotton exchange). 
217  Sally E. Merry, Rethinking Gossip and Scandal, in TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
271, 288 (Donald Black, ed., 1984); see also Daniel B. Klein, Promise Keeping in the Great Society: A 
Model of Credit Information Sharing, 4 ECON. AND POLITICS 117 (1992), reprinted in REPUTATION, supra 
note 158, at 267, 271.  A similar evolution towards governance by more formal institutions characterizes 
the evolution of national courts and formal contract law.  See Todd J. Zywicki, The Evolution of Contract 
Governance (working paper). 
218 See Daniel B. Klein, "Knowledge, Reputation, and Trust, By Voluntary Means," in REPUTATION, supra 
note 158, at 1, 3-7¸ Daniel B. Klein, Credit Information Reporting: Why Free Speech is Vital to Social 
Accountability and Consumer Opportunity, available in http://lsb.scu.edu/faculty/creditreporting.html, at p. 
6 (“The histories of other social accountability mechanisms show a similar pattern of development—from 
informal gossip to local associations to efficient integrated systems serving a great society.”); Klein, 
Promise Keeping, supra note 217; Robert M. Hunt, The Development and Regulation of Consumer Credit 
Reporting in America, Working Paper No. 02-21, Fed. Res. Bank of Philadelphia (Nov. 2002); Macaulay, 
supra note 213. 
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relegated to a single city or town.219  Over time, however, these local credit bureaus 
pooled their available information into larger regional and finally national credit 
reporting bureaus.  Today there are three major national credit bureaus, with a variety of 
regional and industry-specific bureaus as well.220  The development of national credit 
bureaus with standardized reporting replaced more informal institutions of word-of-
mouth gossip and local credit reporting.  This increasing formalization of consumer credit 
reporting both reflects and maintains national consumer credit markets.221   
Where informal institutions weaken, the efficient response historically has been to 
devise these formal “trust substitutes” to supplement and replace them. This logic of 
creating new institutional “trust substitutes” is the animating logic of the proposed 
bankruptcy reform legislation.  Innovations such as means-testing, mandatory consumer 
credit counseling, and the like, can be seen as efforts to develop institutional substitutes 
for the declining influence of social norms that traditionally eschewed bankruptcy and 
encourage debt repayment. 
C. Contracting Around Bankruptcy 
In addition to the more gradual reforms proposed by the bankruptcy reform 
legislation, some scholars have suggested the possibility of more radical reform, such as 
by permitting consumers to opt-out of bankruptcy by allowing contractual waiver of the 
right to file bankruptcy.222  Under this proposal, the right to elect bankruptcy would no 
longer be a mandatory rule, but rather would be a default rule that debtors could elect to 
waive by contract.  In exchange for waiving the right to file bankruptcy ex post, the 
                                                 
219 See Hunt, supra note 218, at 8-9. 
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debtor presumably would gain access to credit on better terms ex ante.  The costs of the 
mandatory bankruptcy discharge provision are substantial—one estimate places it at 
roughly $280 per year per household and an increase in interest rates on unsecured credit 
of 3.2 percent; others place the cost as high as $900.223  Moreover, these costs will 
generally have their greatest impact on marginal borrowers—young lower-income, 
lower-wealth borrowers who are most likely to be turned down for credit as the cost and 
risk rises, who can least afford to pay higher credit costs, and who have the fewest 
number of credit options.  In addition, because these borrowers will have accumulated 
lower household wealth holdings, they will be the most dependent on unsecured credit, 
which is most likely to be adversely affected by increases in credit costs.  Middle class 
borrowers, by contrast, will be more likely to hold homes and cars, and therefore to 
substitute from the use of unsecured credit to secured credit as the cost of unsecured 
credit rises. 
The consumer bankruptcy model described here does provide some support for 
the proposition that the right to a discharge should be a waiveable default rule, rather than 
a mandatory term.  The model indicates that some part of an individual’s decision 
bankruptcy decision is a function of the strength of her moral and psychological 
commitment to performing her contractual obligations rather than filing bankruptcy.  This 
particular information is private and idiosyncratic, and not observable or subject to third-
party verification.  Nonetheless, it is relevant information regarding the economic risk of 
a loan.  As a result, if this information could be accurately and credibly disclosed to the 
market through signaling, it would permit a more efficient risk-based pricing, allowing 
those with a stronger commitment to paying their debts and to live within their means to 
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obtain more credit on less-expensive terms. 224  Because of the mandatory discharge of 
the current system, however, the ability to credibly provide this information to the market 
is limited.   
Making the discharge optional, rather than mandatory, would reduce this problem 
of asymmetric information by enabling credible signaling to the market of one’s private 
information regarding personal reliability and psychological commitment to repaying 
one’s debts and thus one’s lower risk.  By agreeing to waive the discharge, the debtor 
could signal his commitment to repaying that debt, even if he might otherwise be able to 
discharge it in bankruptcy.  Moreover, because this action would be costly to the debtor, 
it would provide a credible signal that would be difficult to fake.225  As a result, the 
willingness to waive the bankruptcy discharge with respect to certain debts could allow 
more accurate pricing of loan terms in the market.  Agreeing to waive the discharge 
would permit trustworthy debtors to reveal private information to the market about the 
reliability of their characters, while making it difficult for less-trustworthy debtors to do 
the same. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Recent research has found that the rise in consumer bankruptcy filings over the 
past twenty-five years has been caused by an increasing propensity of households to file 
                                                 
224 See also Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of the Current Theories, 
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1993) (discussing argument that secured credit is a similar signaling device). 
225 It may be objected that creditors could “force” debtors into waiving their discharge involuntarily.  This 
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bankruptcy in response to financial shocks, rather than worsening household financial 
condition.  This article has offered a model of the consumer bankruptcy process that can 
explain these trends.  Although the empirical evidence to support the model is still early 
in its development, it generally tends to support the model.  More empirical research 
should be done. 
This article is the first word, not the last, in the effort to develop and test a model 
of the consumer bankruptcy process.  Dramatic changes have transformed the consumer 
bankruptcy system over the past twenty-five years.  Nonetheless, the current system 
remains largely unaltered and unresponsive to this revolution.  Most research for the past 
several decades has been designed around the traditional model of consumer bankruptcy.  
This paper calls for a new era in consumer bankruptcy scholarship that will help us to 
understand the world we observe today, rather than that of the past. 
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